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In Good Conscience: 
Expressions of Judicial Conscience in Federal Appellate Opinions 
Sarah M.R. Cravens∗ 
 
Abstract 
This article explores judicial references to what judges may or may 
not do, in their own words, “in good conscience.”  It assesses the 
most common situations in which federal appellate judges use this 
term and it discusses the propriety of different uses and placements 
of those expressions of conscientious commitments that play into 
judicial decisionmaking.  It distinguishes between expressions of 
primarily institutional conscience (that is, the commitment to 
certain institutional values, responsibilities, or limitations on what 
the judge may do) and expressions of primarily personal 
conscience (that is, the commitment to the individual values or 
beliefs of the judge who expresses the matter of conscience).  
Having explored these categories of expressions, and the muddy 
middle ground between them, the article discusses questions of the 
legitimacy of conscience as an input to judicial decisionmaking 
and as a matter for open expression. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 A. Looking at Judicial Conscience 
 
 Justice Holmes, an icon of both the theory and the practice of the appellate 
judicial role, once famously said that the job of the judge is not to “do justice” but 
simply to apply the law.1  Along similar lines, law professors are forever 
reminding our students that when referring to judicial opinions, they ought to say 
that courts “hold” or “state” or “reason,” but not that they “feel” or “believe.”  
But, of course, judges are human, so we know that they do feel and believe things.  
They have convictions and commitments that are important to them, both 
personally and in their official capacities, both on and off the bench.  While it is 
not commonplace, one does find statements of commitment to judicial conscience 
in judicial opinions.  The research for this article, which focuses on the opinions 
                                                          
1
 See Michael Herz, Do Justice! Variations of a Thrice-Told Tale, 82 VA. L. REV. 111 (1996) 
(recounting the uncertainty and debate over the second half of this famous saying).  See also, H. 
Jefferson Powell, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION 
38 (2008) (quoting a different version of the anecdote, citing Learned Hand, THE SPIRIT OF 
LIBERTY 306-07 (1960)). 
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of federal appellate judges, has yielded many examples of courts or individual 
judges who do feel compelled to “do justice” with reference to their conscientious 
commitments.  They express openly and often act on these conscientious 
commitments, both professional and personal, in the decisionmaking process, 
whether or not the “just” outcome is actually available to them as a matter of law. 
This means that at times, as a matter of conscience, judges do speak out, in 
official written opinions, against the apparently straightforward application of 
established law.  As might be expected, there are also opinions in which judges 
speak out specifically against such expressions of conscience, either as a matter 
of explaining what restrains that judge from saying more, or as a matter of 
questioning the propriety of a competing opinion in the same case.  In practice, 
there is little clarity, and certainly less than perfect consensus, about this aspect of 
the appellate judicial role. 
This article explores the propriety of the use of federal appellate opinions 
– especially concurring and dissenting opinions – as platforms for explicit 
statements of conscience.  The discussion here is less about the use of those 
conscientious commitments in reaching a decision, and more about what judges 
actually say about their own conscience in their opinions, and where and how they 
say it.  It assesses normative questions about whether these expressions are 
generally a good or a bad thing in the larger context of the judicial role.  Judicial 
writings are, after all, called “opinions,” but there are substantial questions about 
whether these opinions are supposed to include anything more or other than strict 
legal interpretation.  This article explores the contexts and ends of expression of 
judicial conscience in order to determine the limits of its legitimacy.  The article 
does not catalog the psychological or sociological literature on conscience.  Nor 
does it attempt to define conscience as distinct from any other kind of moral 
commitment.2  Instead it will be limited to an exploration of what judges 
themselves actually say on the record in their official opinions that indicates some 
resort to what those judges themselves refer to specifically as their “conscience.”   
 
B. Lack of Consensus or Clarity 
 
The lack of clarity, in both theory and practice, as to where these 
expressions of conscience belong (if anywhere), and what they may or should 
include, is revealed in the lack of a consistent practice and in the varying reactions 
of individual judges to the choices made by their colleagues.  One example of a 
hesitant uncertainty about what the judicial conscience is, and how it ought to be 
                                                          
2
 There are other discussions of attempts to differentiate between conscience, religious beliefs, 
morality, and so on.  See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Significance of Conscience, 47 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 901 (2010); Martha C. Nussbaum, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S 
TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY (2008). 
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used in the decisionmaking process, appears in an old case from the Seventh 
Circuit.  Judge Grosscup, in a dissenting opinion in a case about gambling, wrote:  
    
Gambling and gambling devices are condemned by the laws of 
every state and territory, except perhaps New Mexico. Upon this it 
can be safely predicated that the conscience of the people of the 
state in which this court sits; of the people of the three states that 
constitute this circuit; indeed, of the people of every state and 
territory, except a little territory bordering on Mexico, condemns 
the practice of gambling. Gambling and gambling devices are 
condemned, also, by the enactments of congress, in the statutes 
forbidding the use of the mails in aid of lotteries and other 
gambling purposes. Thus the national conscience is seen to be 
outspoken against the practice. Nothing could be conceived more 
conclusively showing a general conscience, and a general 
conception of policy. Unless a moral sense, thus widespread and 
unanimous, may be accepted as the conscience, not simply of the 
chancellor, but the judicial conscience, I am at a loss to know 
where to look for any authority for judicial conscience.3 
 
Despite the rhetorical uncertainty of Judge Grosscup’s position here, his position 
may be contrasted with the more recently stated view of Judge Gould of the Ninth 
Circuit, who wrote as follows: “…I pen this dissent to explain my views, because 
a dissent is a matter of individual judicial statement and individual judicial 
conscience.”4  Notably, neither of these judges made an effort to provide any 
authority for their understanding of, or authority to make reference to, “judicial 
conscience.”  In this, they are by no means alone.  There is great variety in the 
apparent meaning and scope given to the idea of judicial conscience as expressed 
in judicial opinions, and very little, if any, support offered for any of those 
positions.  Thus only an examination of the practical usage of the term can hope 
to yield a better understanding of the legitimacy of these expressions.5 
As to more specific questions of placement, there is a similar lack of 
clarity and consistency.  Indeed, one may find cases in which the three judges on 
a single panel agree about an underlying substantive point of right or wrong, 
justice or injustice, but apparently disagree about the propriety of whether to 
                                                          
3
 Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903) (Grosscup, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
4
 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1038 n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (Gould, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
5
 See Kent Greenawalt, The Perceived Authority of Law in Judging Constitutional Cases, 61 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 783, 786 (1990) (making similar commentary on the need to look at actual practice 
to understand judicial conduct). 
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mention their conscientious concerns and about where to make that mention.  
They may make their points in separate opinions and give differing kinds and 
degrees of explanation for the approaches they have taken.6  For instance, a 
majority might apply the law as it stands, but as a matter of conscience note its 
harshness; a concurrence in the same matter might particularly note the fact of 
binding precedent in the face of both personal and institutional conscientious 
objections; and a dissent might state without further explanation a level of 
conscientious discomfort rising to an inability to follow the established law.7  This 
last is perhaps most clearly an abdication of the judicial obligation to apply the 
law, but the fact that it happens at all demonstrates some practical need for such 
an opportunity for expression on the part of those who occupy the judicial role.   
This is also a topic on which many judges have spoken in their off-the-
bench capacities, in speeches or essays intended either for those in the legal 
academy or for the general public.  In those off-the-bench contexts, judges are all 
over the map in their assessments of what is appropriate to the judicial role, and 
why, on what course of action is appropriate, and which are the proper 
motivations for the judge.8  They are in substantial agreement, however, about the 
fact that these are not purely academic questions, but rather, real and painful 
dilemmas they must face in the fulfillment of their basic role obligations. 
 
C.  Limiting the Field 
 
The field for this paper is limited to opinions written by intermediate 
federal appellate judges.  In addition to simply narrowing the field to a more 
manageable number of opinions, this limitation eliminates a variety of 
complications.  First, by eliminating the state-court-specific issue of the potential 
impact of the opinions on retention by re-election or reappointment, it considers 
only the work of those who have the comparative security of life tenure, which 
might factor into judicial decisions about what to express in written opinions.  In 
this way, any (to my mind improper) representative notions of the judicial role 
and accountability in that role, are largely eliminated.9   
Second, it excludes the opinions of courts of last resort, which have more 
commonly been the focus of attention in discussions of the proper uses of 
                                                          
6
 See, e.g., Rico v. Terhune, 63 Fed. Appx. 394 (9th Cir. 2003); Wallace v. Castro, 65 Fed. Appx. 
618 (9th Cir. 2003);  Turner v. Candelaria, 64 Fed. Appx. 647 (9th Cir. 2003). 
7
 Id. 
8
 In the absence of clear law or openly established norms of practice, these tend to be very 
individualized notions.  Informally, for example, one federal appellate judge of long experience 
once explained to me that one dissents only “when one’s indignation outstrips one’s inertia.”   
9
 To my mind, such representative notions of the judicial role are entirely improper. Cf. 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 803-806 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).   
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concurrences and dissents.10  The current Model Code of Judicial Conduct does 
not speak to the issue of concurring or dissenting as presenting any questions, 
ethical or otherwise,11 but the 1924 ABA Canons of Judicial Ethics did have one 
paragraph on the subject.  Former Canon 19 (on Judicial Opinions) said, in 
pertinent part:  
 
It is of high importance that judges constituting a court of last 
resort should use effort and self-restraint to promote solidarity of 
conclusions and the consequent influence of judicial decision.  A 
judge should not yield to pride of opinion or value more highly his 
individual reputation than that of the court to which he should be 
loyal.  Except in case of conscientious difference of opinion on 
fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be discouraged 
in courts of last resort.12 
 
There is no such special consideration of separate opinions at the intermediate 
appellate level, though of course the second sentence of the passage may be 
applied with equal meaning for courts of all levels.  Despite the lack of official 
attention or instruction, at least one of the rationales supporting the worth of 
concurring and dissenting opinions – that is, signaling to a higher court an 
argument for a change in the law – is irrelevant to a court of last resort.  But more 
importantly, thinking in terms of differentiated understandings of the judicial role 
at different levels, a court of last resort – particularly the United States Supreme 
Court – may be more readily accepted as one that more naturally has to make 
                                                          
10
 In 1952, the American Bar Association sponsored an essay contest on the subject of “The 
Functions of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last Resort,” which prompted 
several contributions on the subject.  See, e.g.,  R. Dean Moorhead, The 1952 Ross Prize Essay: 
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 A.B.A. J. 821 (1952) (winner of the competition); 
Richard B. Stephens, The Function of Concurring and Dissenting Opinions in Courts of Last 
Resort, 5 U. FLA. L. REV. 394 (1952) (another entry).  Several others, in addressing the issue of 
special opinions, have focused on issues specific to courts of last resort.  See, e.g., Charles Fried, 
Five to Four: Reflections on the School Voucher Case, 116 HARV. L. REV. 163, 180-83 (2002) 
(articulating differences between collaborative and oppositional dissents at the United States 
Supreme Court); Roscoe Pound, Cacoethes Dissentiendi: The Heated Judicial Dissent, 39 A.B.A. 
J. 794 (1953) (mainly written to criticize one California Supreme Court justice’s dissents). 
11
 American Bar Association, Model Code of Judicial Conduct (2011 ed.) (hereinafter “ABA 
MCJC”). 
12
 American Bar Association, Canons of Judicial Ethics (1924) (emphasis added). 
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more ultimate political or value judgments, 13 and thus, the central question of this 
paper might be answered differently in the context of courts of last resort.14     
Third, by taking district court judges out of the analysis, the article 
contemplates collegial judging in which there is more obviously room for one 
judge to disagree with colleagues on a panel without practical disruption of the 
status quo in the law.  Fourth, it significantly limits the number of questions of 
fact, as opposed to questions of law.  The questions of fact remain to some extent 
in the appellate review of findings of sufficiency of evidence, harmful error, and 
abuse of discretion, and these are situations that do tend to provoke personal 
views in appellate opinions, but again, the sheer number of these is reduced at the 
appellate level, and the focus is thus more clearly on developing and clarifying the 
law and its practical application with regard to these fact questions, as opposed to 
the broader ranging task of actually making the basic factual findings at the 
district court level.   
Ultimately, this limitation to the opinions of federal appellate courts 
presents the question in its most distilled form, considering the perspective of 
non-elected, life-tenured, and (at least theoretically) non-last-resort judges,15 who 
deal primarily in questions of law rather than fact.  Moving from conclusions 
about expressions of conscience in this limited context, one might then be able to 
go further with regard to assessment of the propriety of the practice by judges in 
other courts.  This article thus only tackles a small piece of the bigger question 
about the extent to which judges are meant to consider or use their own views or 
consciences in their judicial decisionmaking, or how they might operate without 
them wherever practical judgment is required.  The answers to these questions 
will of course have implications for their fit into a broader theoretical and 
practical theorization about the fulfillment of the core commitments essential to 
the integrity of the judicial role. 
 
                                                          
13
 See, e.g., Chris W. Bonneau and Melinda Gann Hall, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 11 
(2009).;  James L. Gibson, The Effects of Electoral Campaigns on the Legitimacy of Courts, 59 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 397, 413 (2009) (referring to courts of last resort as “policy makers”). 
14
 This is not to say, of course, that many of the arguments presented in the paper might not be 
relevant as well to courts of last resort, but for purposes of a purer focus, the issues peculiar to 
courts of last resort are eliminated here. 
15
 Due to the very small number of cases taken by Supreme Court, there are ways in which 
intermediate appellate courts in the federal system are de facto courts of last resort, but the cases 
that may be most likely to call for separate opinions may at the same time be those most likely to 
have a chance at being further reviewed, so the de facto reality does not end the inquiry into the 
particularities of intermediate appellate role. 
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D.  Background Theory of the Judicial Role 
 
The understanding of the judicial role that lies at the heart of this paper is 
one of institutional trusteeship of judges.  In this model, judges act as trustees of 
the corpus of the common law, maintaining its integrity through fidelity to past 
decisions and continuing consideration of fit and consistency between and among 
various areas of the law as they develop.16  Intermediate appellate judges, as 
trustees of the law, are accountable to the public for their management of the 
corpus, which accountability they provide primarily in the body of their opinions.  
These judges are in a position to develop and maintain a special perspective on 
the law, one that is both practical and theoretical, both specific and overarching, 
both immediate and long term.   
Furthermore, along with all of the many legal decisions judges must make 
in the execution of their responsibilities, they must always be making decisions 
about allocation of court resources.  Trusteeship implicates a broad array of 
institutional responsibilities – core commitments such as fidelity to legal 
(especially constitutional) authority, impartiality, independence, accountability, 
and practical wisdom – to which judges must be committed.17  They must have 
good judgment about these matters of resources just as they do in their application 
of the law.  Such good judgment and practical wisdom is, for many if not all 
judges, and whether they mention it or not, likely a matter of conscience at some 
level. 
 
                                                          
16
 Though compliance with the law is arguably the most basic aspect of common law judicial 
decisionmaking, (see, e.g. ABA MCJC, supra note 11, Rule 1.1), even on this point, some 
disagree.  Jerome Frank, for instance, argued that there was no hard and fast obligation to follow 
the law, but wrote instead: “But the power to individualise and to legislate judicially is of the very 
essence of their function.  To treat judicial free adaptation and lawmaking as if they were 
bootlegging operations, renders the product unnecessarily impure and harmful.”  Jerome Frank, 
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 121 (1930).   Pointing especially to what he called the “leeways of 
precedent,” Karl Llewellyn advocated a quite flexible view of appellate judicial interpretation as a 
matter of craft and “situation-sense.”   See Karl N. Llewellyn, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: 
DECIDING APPEALS (1960).  A rather more recent view defending outright judicial deviation from 
the law suggests that at times, judges “have the moral right, and moral reasons, to disregard clear 
legal mandates, and not only when the law is extremely unjust.” Jeffrey Brand-Ballard, LIMITS OF 
LEGALITY: THE ETHICS OF LAWLESS JUDGING 13 (2010).  Prof. Brand-Ballard does not direct 
specific attention to the particular question of judicial “conscience” as that term is used by judges 
themselves, so does not reach the precise issue addressed in this article. 
17
 These commitments lead one scholar to refer to judges as the “most constrained” of officials 
when it comes to the bases for their decisions.  See Kent Greenawalt, Religious Liberty and 
Democratic Politics, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 629, 637 (1996).   
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II.  Law and Conscience 
 
 A. Consonance and Dissonance 
 
Law and conscience will of course often be perfectly consonant.18  Most 
of the time, this should be fairly unremarkable, and thus it will not be mentioned 
in the mine run of opinions.  In those situations where no judge on the panel 
disagrees on any material matter in the case, so that only a majority opinion will 
be published, there is often little to be gained by adding considerations of 
conscience or morality to support what is already established law.19  It does 
happen, though, most commonly in instances in which the opinion underscores 
the judicial obligation of faithful adherence to precedent as a matter of 
institutional conscience.20  Other common circumstances for references to 
conscience as further support for an otherwise already legally tenable position 
include matters implicating issues of judicial resources and burdens on the 
courts21 other players in the justice system,22 issues of substantive or procedural 
fairness,23 and others still.24   
                                                          
18
 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994); Ronald Dworkin, TAKING RIGHTS 
SERIOUSLY (1977); Lon L. Fuller, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964). 
19
 Some would not even support the expression of personal reasons to bolster legal determinations.  
See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Religious Liberty and Democratic Politics, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 629, 637 
(1996). 
20
 See, e.g., Carnival Leisure Indus. v. Aubin, 53 F.3d 716, 719 (5th Cir. 1995); Prudential Ins. Co. 
v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 991 F.2d 1080, 1088 (3d Cir. 1993); Illinois Dept. of Revenue v. Phillips, 
771 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1985).   The term ‘institutional conscience’ is further elaborated infra 
at Sections II.D. and III. 
21
 See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1991) (concern about condoning 
litigation that is unmeritorious); Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d 1329, 1347 (5th Cir. 1989) 
(concern about allowing litigation to go on with no definite end point). 
22
 See, e.g., United States v. Corona, 661 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1981) (Sneed, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging it is a difficult case, and majority’s position is defensible, but cannot in good 
conscience ask police officers to subject themselves to the risks that the majority’s rule would 
create for them).   
23
 See, e.g., Morelite Construction Co. v. NYC District Council, 748 F.2d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 1984); 
Hatch v. FERC, 654 F.2d 825, 836 (9th Cir. 1981); THI-Hawaii, Inc. v. First Commerce Financial 
Corp., 627 F.2d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 1980) 
24
 See, e.g., Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 2010) (on appeal of denial of habeas 
petition in multiple murder case with both life and death sentences, court remanded on grounds 
relating to adequacy of counsel, noting that “We simply cannot in good conscience continue to 
send men to their deaths without ensuring that their cases were not prejudiced…”) (emphasis 
added).   
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Such positions do not only appear in unanimous majority opinions, but 
also in dissents in those cases in which at least one judge believes that he is 
correct both on the law and on the morality, but is compelled to write in a 
dissenting opinion due to a difference of legal interpretation between the dissenter 
and others on the court.25  It is the expressions of the consonance of law and 
conscience that appear in the concurring and dissenting opinions, though, that turn 
out to be more worthy of note for the purposes of this discussion.  Where the 
consonance appears in a majority opinion, it simply has that much less force or 
weight, in the light of the clarity of the established law.  However, this article 
does not limit its discussion to cases in which conscience differs from law.  Any 
resort or reference to conscience is ripe for discussion in the effort to develop a 
fuller and clearer understanding of what judicial conscience is and how it fits into 
the shape of the judicial role.26 
While there is perhaps an interesting academic question about the 
propriety of judicial reference to conscience in further support of an 
uncontroverted legal interpretation, the more difficult question is what ought to 
happen when a judge’s considerations of conscience are in conflict with 
established law, or at any rate with the interpretation of the law accepted by a 
majority of the relevant panel.  Any judge who feels faced with a serious 
dissonance between law and conscience has an array of options at least apparently 
open to him. To state them roughly and in relatively short order, a judge could: 
(1) keep silent about the conflict and simply follow the law;27 (2) follow the law, 
                                                          
25
 See, e.g., Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, Mass., 112 F.3d 19, 25(1st Cir. 1997) (Selya, J., 
dissenting) (asserting that majority’s result condones an unconstitutional and intolerable result, 
which he cannot in good conscience join).  The Joyce case drew two other concurrences as well, 
one of which was sympathetic to the dissenting position, but found the very fact of strong 
disagreement of the judges to be evidence that the law wasn’t clear enough to show conclusively 
that the actions in question were objectively unreasonable, id. at 24 (Lynch, J., concurring), and 
the other of which took issue with the dissent for having lost sight of the reasonableness standard, 
id. at 23-24 (Torruella, J., concurring).  See also Ferguson v. Knight, 809 F.2d 1239, 1247 (Jones, 
J., dissenting) (asserting that court can only rely on evidence properly before it: “I cannot in good 
conscience or consistent with my oath, agree to affirm the judgment below.  Justice is being 
mocked here.”); Hatfield, by Hatfield v. Bishop Clarkson Memorial Hosp., 701 F.2d 1266, 1269 
(8th Cir. 1983) (Lay, J., dissenting). 
26
 It is only the judicial references to the conscience of the court or of the individual judge that are 
covered here.  References to the conscientious responsibilities or the conscientious beliefs of 
others – whether made in passing or in the application of legal standards implicating the language 
of conscience – are thus left out of the discussion.  So, for example, Judge McKee, of the Third 
Circuit, notes the “human cost” and the “unconscionable delay” attributable to the government in 
the long term process of a particular immigration case, but he is not talking about the good 
conscience of the court, but rather about the conscientious responsibility of the government. See 
Alvarado v. Atty. Gen. of the United States, 401 Fed. Appx. 673, 675 (3d Cir. 2010) (McKee, J., 
concurring). 
27
 By their very nature, such cases cannot be found for citation. 
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but state the conflict (whether in majority, concurrence, or dissent);28 (3) comply 
with the law and keep silent about the conflict from the bench, but work off the 
bench on law reform efforts in the area of concern;29 (4) find a way (whether 
honest or disingenuous) to get to the conscientious-but-not-legal result without 
mentioning the conflict;30 (5) state the conflict and follow conscience rather than 
law (again, whether in majority, concurrence, or dissent);31 (6) dissent without 
giving a reason;32 (7) recuse from the case;33 or (8) resign from the bench;34 It is a 
broader question, for a separate article, as to how a judge ought to make the 
decision about which option to choose from this full array.  This article is limited, 
as far as possible, to the question of the proper uses of separate opinions for the 
expression of personal convictions by judges of the federal appellate courts.   
 
B. ‘Conscience’ in Judges’ Own Terms 
 
When judges use words and phrases like “in good conscience” or 
“unconscionable,” they do so in many contexts and with a broad range of ideas 
apparently in mind.35  Though some scholarship in this area tends to be focused 
                                                          
28
 See discussion infra at Section III. 
29
 See, e.g., ABA MCJC, supra note 11, Rule 3.2 cmt [1], Rule 3.1 cmt [1, 2], Rule 1.2 cmt [4] 
(2011 ed.). 
30
 See, e.g., Greenawalt, supra note 17 at 637. 
31
 See, e.g., Rico v. Terhune, 63 Fed. Appx. 394, *1 (9th Cir. 2003); Wallace v. Castro, 65 Fed. 
Appx. 618, 619 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J., dissenting); Turner v. Candelaria, 64 Fed. Appx. 
647, 648 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pregerson, J., dissenting); Trailer Train Co. v. State Tax Commission, 
929 F.2d 1300, 1304 (8th Cir. 1991) (Gibson, J., dissenting) (“I do not fault the majority for 
following the precedents of this and other courts of appeal, but I simply cannot in good conscience 
participate in the judicial extension of legislation to an absurd end.”). 
32
 These “silent” dissents are a subject of some debate.  Arguments can be found on both sides.  
Compare, e.g., Hon. Francis P. O’Connor, The Art of Collegiality: Creating Consensus and 
Coping with Dissent, 83 MASS. L. REV. 93, 93 (1998) (essential to give reasoning for a dissent); 
and Roger J. Traynor, Some Open Questions on the Work of State Appellate Courts, 24 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 211, 218 (1957) (suggesting that in some instances it is best for the judge to “record his 
dissent in two words”). 
33
 Like the cases in which judges remain silent as to the conflict or the issue of conscience, 
because judges typically do not give their reasons for recusing in written form, such cases cannot 
be provided for citation. 
34
 See, e.g., Gene E. Franchini, Conscience, Judging, and Conscientious Judging, 2 J. APP. PRAC. 
& PROCESS 19 (2000) (recounting resignation in face of what he saw as a conflict between his oath 
of office and his conscience). 
35
 Sometimes the phrases are used when there is no obvious matter of conscience independent 
from the proper interpretation and application of the law.  See, e.g., Clephas v. Fagelson, 
Shonberger, Payne & Arthur, 719 F.2d 92, 95 (4th Cir. 1983) (Hall, J., concurring) (disagreement 
stated as a matter of conscience appears to be simply an argument that the majority got the law 
wrong, and did so by “cavalierly disregard[ing]” precedent); Harris v. Sentry Title Co, Inc., 715 
F.2d 941, 961 (5th Cir. 1983) (Will, J., dissenting). (After a rehearing before the same panel, Judge 
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specifically on the role or expression of a judge’s religious faith,36 it can be hard 
to distinguish – and it is probably pointless to try to divine any distinction, for 
purposes of this paper – between religiously-based convictions and any other 
personal commitments that underlie actual judicial usage of the word 
‘conscience.’37  It is difficult to pin down a particular consensus definition of 
conscience or the unconscionable, either in the actual usage by judges or in the 
legal academic literature that has built up around this concept.  Much might be 
included, but some usages are clearly of more import than others for this topic.  
Black’s Law Dictionary defines conscience as “1. The moral sense of right or 
wrong; esp., a moral sense applied to one’s own judgment and actions.  2. In law, 
the moral rule that requires justice and honest dealings between people.”38  This 
underscores the overlap and thus the lack of specific distinction, among the terms 
‘conscience,’ ‘morality’ and ‘justice.’39 
These terms must, to a certain extent, be left a bit muddy, because one 
must take them as the courts use them.  Judges are not necessarily philosophers or 
                                                                                                                                                               
Will again dissented, but made no further specific reference to conscience. Harris v. Sentry Title 
Co., 727 F.2d 1368 (5th Cir. 1984).)  Along similar lines, the concurrence/dissent in United States 
v. Holmes uses language about conscience and ‘miscarriage of justice,’ but does so in the context 
of what looks like an argument about the validity of the majority’s interpretation of precedent.  
The opinion uses conscience on both sides, talking both about “conscientious” deference to 
precedent and about a potential miscarriage of justice in following that precedent as interpreted.  
United States v. Holmes, 822 F.2d 481, 506 (5th Cir. 1987) (Brown, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
36
 See, e.g., Diarmuid O’Scannlain, Must a Faithful Judge be a Faithless Judge?, 4 U. ST. THOMAS 
L. J. 157 (2006); William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American 
Catholic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 347 (2006); William H. Pryor, Jr., Christian Duty and 
the Rule of Law, 34 Cumb. L. Rev. 1, 8 (2003); Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious 
Values in Judicial Decision-Making, 81 Marq. L. Rev. 513 (1998); Ori Lev, Personal Morality 
and Judicial Decision-Making in the Death Penalty Context, 11 J. L. & RELIG. 637 (1995).   
37
 Greenwalt, supra note 2, at 909-16.  
38
 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).  Further definitions of terms such as “conscience of 
the court” and “shocks the conscience” reiterate concepts of “fairness” and “justice” as the basis 
for conscience.  “Conscionable” is defined as “conforming with good conscience; just and 
reasonable.” “Shock the conscience” goes somewhat further, in its meaning: “to cause intense 
ethical or humanitarian discomfort.” “Unconscionability” is defined as “extreme unfairness” and 
“unconscionable” is defined as “(of a person) having no conscience; unscrupulous” and as “(of an 
act or transaction) showing no regard for conscience; affronting the sense of justice, decency, or 
reasonableness.”   
39
 Acknowledging that definitions of conscience may vary according to context, Prof. Greenawalt 
has suggested that matters of conscience are those that involve “judgments believed by those 
making them to be of considerable moral importance.”  Greenawalt, supra note 2, at 901, 903-04.  
Martha Nussbaum somewhat more broadly suggests that conscience is a matter of the “search for 
life’s ultimate meaning.”  Nussbaum,  supra note 3, at 19.  Prof. Powell, writing about conscience 
in Supreme Court decisions in Constitutional cases, speaks of making decisions “in good faith” 
and “according to the rules.”  Powell, supra note 1 , passim. 
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linguists, and they are not typically concerned with precision about distinctions 
among these particular terms.40  Furthermore, to get too technical about the verbal 
or semantic distinctions here might even encourage an unwarranted and unhelpful 
formalism by judges.  Examination of the variety of uses of these terms by judges 
does however reveal some broad categories of apparent meaning.  Sometimes it is 
a matter of a judge’s core personal conviction about right and wrong; sometimes 
it is a matter of responsibility for the integrity of the institution (for the proper 
role of the court, for its reputation, or for proper use of its resources, for 
example);41 sometimes it is an attempt to speak for something like a ‘common 
conscience’ or a common public notion of justice or other values;42 sometimes it 
is simply a matter of personal honesty about a particular view of the facts or the 
law in a given case.43   
Very often, phrases like “in good conscience” or “unconscionable” or 
other variants on these, come up in cases having to do in one way or another with 
liberty interests, and of those very often the cases are before the court on appeals 
of denials of habeas petitions.44  These are decisions in which a panel’s collective 
decision may effectively be the end of the road on life and death issues.  Another 
common context for these expressions of conscience is in dissents from denials of 
petitions for rehearing en banc – again, an end of the road determination, which 
may introduce frustration about the full court not taking up a matter a judge 
                                                          
40
 Judge Merritt, for example, at one point roughly equates the idea of ‘judicial conscience’ with 
‘equity,’ but the terms of that equation are themselves quite flexible and open.  United States v. 
Phinazee, 515 F.3d 511, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
41
 See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 717 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (Reinhardt, concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (on how majority opinion, which is inconsistent with dignity of man, 
will harm reputation of court); Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 1991) 
(Altimari, J., dissenting) (“cannot in good conscience sit idly by and allow the Due Process clause 
to become mere words).  An historical perspective adds the idea of a meaning of honesty with 
special reference to judicial knowledge of facts not otherwise admissible/provable.  See Mike 
Macnair, Equity and Conscience, 27 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 659 (2007). 
42
 See, e.g., Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274 (7th Cir. 1903) (Grosscup, J., dissenting). 
43
 See, e.g., United States v. Silva-Arzeta, 602 F.3d 1208, 1220 (10th Cir. 2010) (Holloway, J., 
dissenting) (stating that though he cannot find fault with the majority opinion, he nonetheless 
cannot sign on to an opinion that affirms such a troubling accumulations of police errors); Byrd v. 
Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 548 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., dissenting); Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, 
J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 616 (1st Cir. 1996) (Cyr, J., dissenting) (citing “fundamental disagreement” with 
treatment of this case under Supreme Court precedent).  In this last case, a concurrence called it a 
close case under precedent, noted the muddled nature of Supreme Court precedent, and noted that 
it was only a matter of the binding nature of that precedent that permitted him to sign onto the 
opinion in good conscience.  Id. at 616 (Selya, J., concurring). 
44
 See, e.g., Ferguson v. Knight, 809 F.2d 1239, 1247 (Jones, J., dissenting); Campbell v. Wood, 
20 F.3d 1050, 1051-54 (1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Campbell 
v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 717 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); 
Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1540 (9th Cir. 1990) 
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believes to be a moral imperative for further attention.45  Although judges 
certainly do use other related terms such as morality, injustice, and unfairness as 
well in these kinds of scenarios, this article limits the discussion to those 
specifically using ‘conscience’ and its cognates, in an attempt to get a clearer 
picture of what judges themselves see as the proper role for their conscientious 
commitments in their decisionmaking and what that may reveal to help us better 
understand the larger shape of the judicial role.46 
                                                          
45
 See discussion infra at Section III.G. 
46
 Though this paper is limited to judicial references to “conscience” in particular, similar themes 
emerge in cases using other terms, so the observations here may be more broadly true of judicial 
use of other terms as well.  For example, without referencing “conscience” specifically, Judge Hill 
wrote in a dissenting opinion about the responsibility to follow the law even where the judge’s 
own view may differ (i.e. a point similar to what will be discussed below on matters of separation 
of powers):  
As I have previously asserted, the adage “Hard cases make bad law” ought to be 
taken as a warning and not as a mandate.  In re Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 542 
F.2d 297, 298 (5th Cir. 1976) (Hill, J., dissenting), rev’d, 430 U.S. 723, 97 S.Ct. 
1439, 52 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977). This is a hard case. The court, today, makes bad law. 
Though tempted, I cannot join.  The court faces a “hard” case “whenever the 
judge of the court has the power to order that which he believes to be right and, 
yet, he does not have the authority to issue the order.” Id. This case qualifies as a 
“hard” case. The district court found that McGinnis “suffered many more racial 
indignities at the hands of the Company than any one citizen should be called 
upon to bear in a lifetime.” . . .  Although we yearn for McGinnis to be 
compensated for those indignities and though the federal courts have power to 
order compensation, I submit that we unfortunately may not have the authority 
to do so.   
McGinnis v. Ingram Equip. Co., Inc. 918 F.2d 1491, 1498 (Hill, J., dissenting) (citations 
omitted).)  Along similar lines, Judge Bork dissented, speaking to the temptation judges face with 
regard to doing justice, again without specific reference to conscience, but illuminating similar 
themes: 
This case illustrates the costs to the legal system when compassion displaces 
law. The panel majority says it is not too late for justice to be done. But we 
administer justice according to law. Justice in a larger sense, justice according to 
morality, is for Congress and the President to administer, if they see fit, through 
the creation of new law. The wartime internment around which this case 
revolves is undeniably a very troublesome part of our history. It is within the 
authority of the political branches to make whatever reparations they deem 
appropriate, and it is my understanding that such legislation is presently under 
consideration. The issue of whether an additional remedy is available from a 
court, and, if so, which court, should only be resolved on the basis of a sober and 
fair assessment of the legal claims presented. When a court relies instead on a 
plainly deficient analysis, it fails to do justice to the parties before it, and 
inevitably establishes those deficiencies as precedent. The temptation to do so, 
in service of an attractive outcome, is often strong. The panel opinion in this 
case, which completely disrupts a carefully crafted jurisdictional scheme while 
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Some instances of these words and phrases relating to conscience should 
be bracketed off from the central inquiry here – most notably those in which the 
word or phrase is itself a part of a legal standard being applied.  So, for example: 
“unconscionable” where it is used as a standard in the substantive law of 
contract;47 “in equity and good conscience” where it is used as a substantive 
standard under FRCP 19(b) with reference to joinder;48 and “shocks the 
conscience” with regard to judicial review of damages awards.49  In these 
instances (among others), because judges are explicitly employing the terms 
themselves as legal standards, the words come with more established meanings in 
case law – they are terms of art with definitions already built up in the law.  Thus 
in these instances, there is less (if indeed any) idea of potential dissonance 
between law and conscience on the part of the individual judge.  The deployment 
of the legal standard may require some application of the individual judge’s own 
conscientious commitment, but that standard in which conscience is explicitly 
called for will be imbued with and guided by the implications of past decisions 
under the standard.  In these situations, there is no controversy or conflict over the 
propriety of the expression of what might be thought of as a personal view of 
conscience, because here the personal has been, to a limited extent, expressly 
imported into the legal analysis.  In short, the law itself calls for the judge’s 
consideration of conscience.  These are situations in which the law explicitly calls 
for the application of the “practical wisdom” of the judge.  This article for the 
most part leaves aside discussion of these situations in order to focus on those in 
which the judge decides, independent of any explicit legal permission or 
requirement, to express a view as to conscience.   
Some federal appellate judges seem more inclined than others to give open 
written expression to their appeals to conscience in their decisionmaking.50  
                                                                                                                                                               
establishing several unfounded and undesirable precedents as law, demonstrates 
why such temptations ought to be resisted.46  
Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 313 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting).  The 
emphasis here on “costs to the legal system” and “a carefully crafted jurisdictional 
scheme” underscores the institutional or public perspective here, as opposed to the 
personal, and sets up a direct contrast between that perspective - “law” - and 
“compassion” which it sets up as a temptation to incorporate the more personal.  The 
explanation given here regarding context does not shy away from resorting to common 
sense, but still notes the impropriety of succumbing to the temptations to do justice apart 
from the law.   
47
 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-302. 
48
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19(b). 
49
 See 11 Charles Alan Wright et al., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §2815, at 162 n.7 (2d 
ed. 1995). 
50
 On the Ninth Circuit, Judges Pregerson and Reinhardt easily top the list.  Following behind 
them are, on the First Circuit, Judge Selya; on the Second Circuit, Judge Feinberg; on the Sixth 
Circuit, Judge Keith, and on the Eighth Circuit, Judge Lay. 
DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
 
16 
 
However, it is hard to say for certain why this might be so.  No particularly 
reliable patterns emerge in looking at the work of any given judge, as to 
justification, placement, or any other aspect of the expression.  The best one can 
do is assess the broad sweep of the circumstances in which these expressions of 
conscience appear across the board, looking at the content, the tone, the 
contextual placement in majorities, concurrences, or dissents, and try to get a 
picture of what judges on these particular courts are doing.  Whatever one may 
gather from that effort may then provide a jumping-off point for assessment of the 
propriety of these expressions as an aspect of the judicial role more broadly, 
considering other types of courts with different tasks, different selection and 
retention methods, and so on. 
  
C. The Special Problem of Discretion 
 
A murky and therefore problematic area for this question is that of review 
of discretionary decisions, where a real lack of clarity or consensus about the 
bounds on proper inputs or the forthrightness of explanation clouds the field of 
appellate review.51  The appellate standard of “abuse of discretion,” if it is to 
mean something distinct from clear legal error must, to a certain extent, be in the 
eye of the beholder – a matter of individual judgment.52  Where discretion exists, 
there is a range of options properly available to the decisionmaker at a lower 
level, any of which must be permissible.53  The substance and process of such 
discretionary decisionmaking is more guided, more circumscribed or curtailed, in 
some bodies of law than in others.54  The more guidance is given, the more these 
discretionary decisions are tied to an established concept of “the law.”  The less 
guided they are, the more the implication for the reviewing judge is one that 
allows (or even requires) a degree of second-guessing the original decisionmaker 
based on how the reviewing judge would have made the original decision.55  
                                                          
51
 See Sarah M. R. Cravens, Judging Discretion: Contexts for Understanding the Role of 
Judgment, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 947 (2010).   
52
 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “discretion” variously as “wise conduct and management; 
cautious discernment; prudence;” “individual judgment; the power of free decision-making;” “a 
public official’s power or right to act in certain circumstances  according to personal judgment and 
conscience.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009). 
53
 Abuse of discretion is defined in Black’s as “1. An adjudicator’s failure to exercise sound, 
reasonable, and legal decision-making. . . . 2. An appellate court’s standard for reviewing a 
decision that is asserted to be grossly unsound, unreasonable, illegal, or unsupported by the 
evidence.” 
54
 See Cravens, supra note 51, passim.    
55
 Id.  One assessment of the propriety of rule-departures by public officials suggests that 
discretionary decisions may be the only proper ground for judicial departures from the rule of law 
in deference to the judge’s own preferences.  See Mortimer R. Kadish & Sanford H. Kadish, 
DISCRETION TO DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL RULES 91 (1973) 
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Plenty of language in case law and in secondary materials insists that decisions 
about abuse of discretion ought not to be about second-guessing, or about the 
application of a different (and not necessarily better) judicial instinct, but without 
other content to fill the standard, these may well be further instances that 
explicitly invite the judge’s personal views into the mix.56  If that is so, those 
personal views ought to be as freely expressed as those noted above in response to 
the standards like “unconscionable” and “shocks the conscience,” not just for 
purposes of transparency and understanding of what goes on in the process of 
judicial decisionmaking,57 but to provide better guidance to the lower court 
decisionmakers about what lies inside and outside the bounds of the standards that 
apply to their work. 
 
D. Differentiating Personal and Institutional Conscience 
 
Though this article specifically excepts certain types of decisions for 
purposes of its discussion, there is really nothing to limit the subject matter of the 
cases in which these statements of judicial conscience may be found.  They crop 
up in a multitude of matters from the most dramatic issues of personal dignity and 
liberty, to those of discrimination, to personal injury cases, will contests, and even 
seemingly mundane matters of statutory interpretation implicating significant 
issues about the role of the courts, or the doing of justice.  There is, however, one 
significant line that can be drawn, cutting across the divisions of subject matter.  It 
is not a perfectly clear or exact line, but it is an important one nonetheless.  It is 
the line between expressions of personal conscience and expressions of the 
institutional conscience of the judiciary.   
When we look at what judges actually say, in the cases in which they note 
either a conflict or a consonance between the law and the judicial conscience, the 
categories are not hermetically sealed from one another.  They do bleed over into 
                                                          
56
 Or as one panel from the Eighth Circuit put the issue, using the term “judicial ‘grace’”:  
An exercise of the power to require the Government to furnish the defendant 
with a copy of his confession would of course, be wholly a matter of judicial 
grace. There could hardly be any need to exercise it, where the attempt to obtain 
a copy manifestly was simply a part of a blunderbuss-roving, so that the 
privilege thereby would tend to reach the stature of an absolute right. But there 
may be cases where the circumstances are such that the judicial conscience 
properly feels that the interest of justice will be best served by allowing the 
defendant before trial to have a copy of his confession. 
Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838, 845 (8th Cir. 1949). 
57
 See, e.g., Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1540 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting) 
(concerned, as matter of belief and conscience, about transparency to public about what goes on in 
death penalty cases).  A separate dissent in the same case ended with the dissenter’s statement that 
he “decline[d] to participate further  in the unconscionable delays that have occurred in reaching a 
final determination in this matter.”  Id. at 1546 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
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one another, and of course this makes sense.  The judge inhabits the judicial role.  
The judge is both person and professional at the same time.  And of course, as is 
often stated in response to arguments promoting an ideal of completely impartial 
and impersonal judging, judges are human.58  Their humanity and their profession 
can meet and mix in perfectly acceptable and even desirable ways, such that the 
personal conscience itself may independently require a strict adherence to the 
institutionally-loyal judicial conscience.  There is also a substantial patch of grey, 
where conscience of an undefined nature is muddled into an argument that the 
other judges on the case actually do have the law itself wrong.  But there is still 
something quite useful in the division of these two categories, to the extent that it 
can be achieved.   
One of the first and most basic observations one can make about any 
expression of conscience in an opinion is that of the pronoun used in conjunction 
with the statement of conscience, specifically whether it is singular or plural.  
There is usually a difference between saying, on the one hand “I cannot in good 
conscience…” or on the other hand, “We cannot in good conscience…”.  While 
the plural “we” is more often used when the reference appears in a majority (and 
typically that is in a unanimous panel), the plural may also be found in a 
concurrence or dissent when the judge means to emphasize the perspective of the 
institution of the judiciary, rather than his or her own individual perspective. By 
contrast, when the singular “I” is used, it often makes explicit the specific 
intention to make reference to the individual perspective.  That first person 
perspective might be tempered by language that underscores an individual 
understanding of an institutional perspective or responsibility,59 or it might be left 
as a purely personal conviction being brought to bear on the case.60  In any case, 
the pronoun or referent may be a helpful (though certainly not dispositive) starting 
point in understanding the motivation and the intended perspective of the one 
expressing the conscientious view. 
 
                                                          
58
 Or to use Prof. Fiss’ terms, judges are “thoroughly socialized member[s] of a profession.”  
Owen Fiss, THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 173 (2003). 
59
 See, e.g., United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1978) (Coleman, J., concurring) 
(acknowledging correct statement of law by majority, but stating personal opposition, based on 
personal experience in the system, to that established law).   
60
 See, e.g., Rico v. Terhune, 63 Fed. Appx. 394, *1 (9th Cir. 2003 (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
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E.  Roadmap 
 
 With all this as background, this article will go on to explore first judicial 
expressions of institutional conscience,61 then judicial expressions of 
predominantly personal conscience,62 and the muddy middle ground in which the 
two are most closely intertwined.63  It will then go on to assess the legitimacy of 
these expressions, particularly with regard to the placement of the expressions in 
concurring and dissenting opinions.64  Finally, it will suggest areas for further 
exploration of these and related questions.65  
 
III.  Expressions of Institutional Conscience 
 
 A.  Basic Themes 
 
 One major theme that emerges from the exploration of federal appellate 
statements of conscientious decisionmaking is, unsurprisingly, a theme of 
responsibility for the integrity of the institution of the courts.  Of course, this 
commitment to the integrity of the institution may be personal or professional or 
both, but the focus in these cases is on speaking for the institution.  Any opinion, 
but particularly separate opinions, either concurrences or dissents, may note 
concern for the reputation (sometimes stated in terms of morality) of the 
institution, lest the particular court or the broader institution of the judiciary, be 
implicated in doing injustice.66  These expressions of institutional conscience 
cover a wide array of topics, but they are united in their commitment to ideals of 
professional responsibility of the role.  There is often an explicit statement of 
commitment to the law and to the role of the judge as one separate from the other 
branches, specifically restrained from the law-making function.  An opinion may 
note the conflict between the commitment to that role and a personal commitment 
to conscience, justice, etc., but explicitly leave the problem to the other (law-
making) branches to resolve.  Of course, there is not always a conflict in these 
cases.  Opinions can and do include references to acting in good conscience in 
following the law, in a way wholly consistent with an idea of integrity in the 
judicial role, but the lack of a conflict to resolve or a stand to be taken means that 
these cases do not add much to this discussion. 
                                                          
61
 See discussion infra at Section III. 
62
 See discussion infra at Section IV. 
63
 See discussion infra at Section V. 
64
 See discussion infra at Section VI. 
65
 See discussion infra at Section VII. 
66
 See, e.g., Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 1994) (on how majority opinion, which is 
inconsistent with dignity of man, will harm reputation of court). 
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 Ultimately the importance of this category of cases is in the legitimate 
added value attached to the role of the speaker as a judge, as an applier of laws, as 
a part of the institution in practice, day by day, case by case, and over a long 
stretch of time.  The emphasis that is useful here is the emphasis on the worth of 
informed institutional conscience, built up over time from this special perspective 
on the operation of the law in practice.  Judges in these instances are not speaking 
from personal, but institutional perspectives.  They are not expressing their 
individual or personal commitments.  Instead, they are expressing what can (or 
should) be expected of the institution of our system of law, justice, courts, and so 
on, and the ways in which a special perspective from the bench shows that the 
result in the case does or does not meet these expectations. 
Judges are uniquely situated to see the practical application of the law 
across a variety of circumstances.  They see the law in practice with a breadth and 
a specificity of application that legislators, for example, may not have the full 
capacity to anticipate, and in a trusteeship model, they bear special responsibility 
for bringing that perspective to bear in the best interests of the institution of the 
courts and the corpus of the law.  This is not to say that all expressions of judicial 
conscience relating to institutional responsibility are a matter of unanimous 
conviction.  Judges’ perspectives from this special vantage point differ.  Judges 
disagree on these matters just as surely as they do on matters of direct 
interpretation and application of substantive law.   
 There are several common categories or subject matter areas into which 
expressions of institutional conscience may be divided for discussion.  Major 
issues that tend to provoke these expressions, and therefore the subsections to be 
addressed below, include adherence to precedent, separation of powers, due 
process, burdens on court resources, credibility or reputation of the courts, and 
denials of rehearings en banc. 
 
B.  Adherence to Precedent 
 
 Perhaps one of the most obvious and apparently straightforward matters of 
conscientious institutional judicial responsibility is that of adherence to precedent.  
It is a basic commitment and expectation at every level of judging that these 
trustees of the law will not simply make up the law as they go along, but will 
respect the rule of law and the doctrine of stare decisis.67  Stare decisis is not an 
entirely inflexible doctrine, of course.  There are appropriate times and places for 
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 A straightforward example of this commitment, in which there is also a reference to conscience, 
appears in a Tenth Circuit panel’s opinion as follows: “Although defendants present a provocative 
argument, we cannot agree with it without forsaking the rule of law. . . .  In good conscience, 
therefore, we cannot conclude the defendants' double jeopardy argument has validity.”  United 
States v. Dominguez-Carmona, 202 F.3d 283, *2 (10th Cir. 1999). 
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breaking with precedent, but those are generally taken to be the province of 
highest courts, rather than intermediate appellate courts.  Adherence to precedent, 
therefore, is an interesting testing ground for ideas about institutional conscience, 
especially as expressed in separate opinions.   
It is not unusual to find expressions in majority opinions that note the 
weighty obligation to follow precedent, but drop a hint or more of dissatisfaction 
with that precedent.  A simple example might look something like this: 
 
Although the Blanset and Tooahnippah cases require us to affirm 
the judgment in the Secretary's favor, we cannot in good 
conscience do so without expressing our dissatisfaction with this 
state of the law.68 
 
This keeps the model of restrained judging intact, and demonstrates a fundamental 
respect for this central obligation of the judiciary to respect the doctrine of stare 
decisis, but it does still claim (without directly claiming any authority to do so) a 
role for judicial conscience, to look beyond the question of whether the precedent 
is binding, to the question of whether it is right. 
Other opinions take a somewhat more clearly articulated approach, such as 
the following: 
 
Were the question of parole ineligibility before this Court for the 
first time, the considerable appeal of these recent decisions might 
persuade us to a like position. However, in Trujillo v. United 
States, . . . this Court rejected the argument that parole ineligibility 
is a consequence of a guilty plea within the meaning of Rule 11. 
We are bound by that result. We therefore conclude, as we did in 
Trujillo, that the trial judge was not required to inform defendant 
of his ineligibility for parole. . . .  We cannot in good conscience 
find any meaningful difference for purposes of Rule 11 between 
ineligibility for probation and ineligibility for parole. We therefore 
conclude that Trujillo is equally binding on both questions. . . . 
This panel being impotent to overrule Trujillo we abide and apply 
its edict.69 
 
This excerpt points specifically to core judicial role obligations and key judicial 
skills as matters of conscientious fulfillment of institutional responsibility. In the 
course of the reasoning, the panel  (unanimously and thus expressing its views 
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 Akers v. Morton, 499 F.2d 44, 47 (9th Cir. 1974) (unanimous panel opinion) (emphasis added).  
69
 Sanchez v. United States, 417 F.2d 494, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1969) (unanimous panel opinion) 
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).  
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with the word “we”) looks to binding authority at the outset, explores other case 
law and rules, and tests for meaningful distinctions as to the application of the law 
to the circumstances before the court.  This is appellate judicial work at its most 
basic and straightforward, but expressed specifically as a matter of conscientious 
judicial responsibility when the court is faced with the fact that it has no power to 
reach a result it would prefer.  The court makes a special effort to emphasize the 
weight of the institutional responsibility that constrains its judgment.  
A majority opinion might, on the other hand, express dissatisfaction with 
the established law by pointing to a separate opinion in the same case to 
emphasize the point, as here: 
 
Despite our conclusion, we agree with the sentiments expressed in 
the dissent. This is an unfortunate outcome in a sympathetic case. 
To remove a single mother of three who has lawfully lived and 
worked in the United States for two decades, despite the family 
upheaval and separation that it will entail, is “unconscionable,” see 
Dissent at 62; that this pro se petitioner has been unable to obtain 
review of the BIA's decision to deny relief because of procedural 
errors is also unfair. However, the result we reach is dictated by 
existing law and does not, as a matter of law, violate the Due 
Process Clause. See Dissent at 62.70 
 
The propriety of such expressions of discontent or disagreement with the 
precedent that must be applied as a matter of conscientious fulfillment of judicial 
obligation depends somewhat on the manner of the expression.  In each of the 
examples offered so far, the tone is measured and respectful and underscores the 
obligation without questioning its validity or importance.  On the one hand, one 
might argue that any expression beyond the mechanical application of the relevant 
precedent is out of bounds, as tending to reveal the individual perspective of those 
on a particular panel.  Some might find any such expression undesirable for the 
fact that it raises genuine concerns about whether legal results may differ based 
on judicial assignments in a given case.  These may, however, be desirable 
expressions of disagreement, couched as they are in respect for a restrained role at 
the intermediate appellate level, simply raising an issue here or there, either for 
consideration by another body (be it a higher court or a legislature), or as a signal 
to the broader public to show an awareness of and concern for the broader issues 
implicated by a matter before them, along with a sensibility of their inability to 
act on those issues.  This kind of special perspective from the bench, properly 
restrained in light of recognition of the superseding obligation to follow 
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 Carranza v. Holder, 356 Fed. Appx. 61, 62 (9th Cir. 2009) (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
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precedent, is in the end an added value, and one which may well underscore 
consistency across judges and panels in light of deference to precedent, in such a 
way as to bolster public confidence in the judiciary. 
 One step further along the expressive line, a judge might acknowledge the 
obligation to follow precedent, but at the same time emphasize a disagreement 
with that precedent by placing the expression in a separate concurring opinion.  
Without any concrete rules to guide the purpose or content of concurring 
opinions, one must look to the broader underlying theory of the judicial role to 
assess what is and is not appropriate here.  Sometimes these expressions are quite 
brief and simple.  In three separate cases, for example, Judge Reinhardt used 
nearly identical language to express his position on various applications of the 
three-strikes law.71  In these cases, his concurrence reads: “I concur only under 
the compulsion of the Supreme Court’s decision in Andrade.  I believe the 
sentence is both unconscionable and unconstitutional.”72  Sometimes such 
straightforward expressions are followed by a fuller elaboration, as in the case of 
a concurring opinion by Judge Kozinski, which begins: “I reluctantly join the 
court's opinion because I believe it faithfully applies the law of this circuit. The 
result we reach is difficult to reconcile, however, with good sense, good 
conscience or good law.”73  He continues for a few pages to explain this position, 
as opposed to leaving it at the distilled expression found in the three-strikes 
concurrences by Judge Reinhardt.74   
Sometimes the expressions of disagreement are a bit more involved than 
the former simple and straightforward samples, as in this excerpt from one of 
Judge Selya’s concurrences: 
 
Under existing Supreme Court precedent, this is a close and vexing 
case. . . . In my view, this self-induced schizophrenia muddies the 
law and disrupts the balance that Congress labored to strike. . . . 
This reasoning leads me to conclude, with all respect, either that 
Congress inadvertently muddied the waters in phrasing LHWCA 
§905(b), or, alternatively, that Jones & Laughlin was wrongly 
decided. Still, I recognize that the Supreme Court's opinion is 
binding on this court, and that we therefore must undertake what 
Judge Campbell charitably terms “an elusive quest.” . . . Once 
                                                          
71
 See Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63 (2003) (upholding California’s three-strikes law).  
72
 Turner v. Candelaria, 64 Fed. Appx. 647, 648 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).  Cf. 
Rico v. Terhune, 63 Fed. Appx. 394, *1 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring).  See also 
Wallace v. Castro, 65 Fed. Appx. 618, 619 (9th Cir. 2003) (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (adding 
specification of the crime – petty theft – for which the sentence was being imposed).  
73
 Operating Engineers Pension Trust v. Giorgi, 788 F.2d 620, 623 (9th Cir. 1986) (Kozinski, J., 
concurring).  
74
 Id. at 623-35. 
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reconciled to that necessity, I can in good conscience join this 
court's cogent opinion. I write separately, however, to urge the 
Supreme Court and Congress to reflect upon the mind games that 
Jones & Laughlin-particularly as applied to harbor workers-
compels us to play, and, hopefully, to revisit the question of 
whether “dual capacity” employers should be liable at all in 
negligence actions brought by their employees.75 
 
This example shows how such a concurrence can demonstrate by its own terms its 
focus on institutional responsibility, emphasizing as it does not just the individual 
views of its authors, but an institutional concern for clarity, consistency, and 
reason in the law.  A dissent in the same case takes the same perspective, but goes 
so far as to say that these institutional concerns for legitimacy compel that judge 
to dissent.76 
Another possibility is that a majority opinion itself might, without explicit 
comment, fail to follow precedent because, as a matter of conscience, the judges 
on the panel do not wish to follow it, but cases actually expressing this position as 
such are unlikely to be found.  A majority opinion must present its reasoning, or 
at any rate justify it, as well founded in legal argument, which may reveal a 
weakness in the majority position without giving an idea of conscientious 
objection underlying the decision.  However, one may more readily find 
dissenting opinions that claim to unveil such behavior on the part of the majority.  
Examples of such dissenting expressions of a conscientious need to more closely 
conform to institutional obligations take forms like the following: 
 
Although I applaud the withdrawal of the panel opinion, I cannot 
in good conscience join the opinion of the en banc court; that 
opinion admittedly edges closer to the holding demanded by 
clearly established law, but stops short of adhering to it and, thus, 
perpetuates a constitutionally intolerable result. Respectfully and 
regretfully, I dissent.77 
 
Or: “Thus, although I might personally prefer the rule espoused by the majority, I 
cannot in good conscience reconcile it with ERISA's exceptionally broad 
                                                          
75
 Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 616 (1st Cir. 1996) (Selya, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
76
 Id. at 616-24 (Cyr, J., dissenting).  Judge Cyr does not specifically refer to conscience in his 
own words, but implicitly responds to Judge Selya’s remark. 
77
 Joyce v. Town of Tewksbury, Mass., 112 F.3d 19, 25 (1st Cir. 1997) (Selya, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
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preemptive language, nor with the Supreme Court's and our construction of it.”78  
These examples show that although the judge recognizes and is personally 
sympathetic to what might be a preferable outcome according to the judge’s own 
view, that sympathy is overridden by conscientious commitment to the role and 
responsibility of the judge in following established law.  It is only in a dissent 
because the others on the panel saw things otherwise.  Some, however, take more 
issue with such departures by a majority opinion: 
 
I strongly oppose the filing of this opinion. In my view, it cavalierly 
disregards both Supreme Court guidelines and our own case 
precedent and cannot be sanctioned in good conscience. The 
merits of appellant's case should not be addressed.79  
 
Or: 
 
At a time like the present when the federal courts are overburdened 
with cases of national import and when the right to remove causes 
on grounds of diversity has become of more than doubtful utility, . 
. . it seems strange that this court should cavalierly turn its back on 
so much thoughtful precedent and lay down rules subversive of the 
statute, merely because it feels that in this particular case ‘justice 
and good conscience’ require that a ‘manifest error’ be 
corrected.80 
 
Examples like these last two underscore the conscientious institutional 
responsibility to respect the rule of adherence to precedent, and do not express 
their disagreement with the majority primarily as a personal matter, but rather as 
an institutional matter, taking their colleagues to task as remiss in their 
obligations.   
 That said, some dissents may present similar arguments, taking their 
colleagues to task for following precedent when a value such as “justice” 
(according to the dissent) compels otherwise.  These examples present 
particularly close cases when the majority explicitly considers itself to be 
compelled to follow precedent.  So, for example, a part-concurrence, part-dissent 
explains: 
                                                          
78
 Campbell v. Aerospace Corp., 123 F.3d 1308, 1317 (9th Cir. 1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
79
 Clephas v. Fagelson, Shonberger, Payne & Arthur, 719 F.2d 92, 95 (4th Cir. 1983) (Hall, J., 
concurring) (writing in concurrence because he did agree with the conclusion of the majority 
opinion, but did not agree with the decision to address the merits of the appeal in the first place). 
80
 Bucy v. Nevada Construction Co., 125 F.2d 213, 221 (9th Cir. 1942) (Healy, J., dissenting) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added).   
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It is unconscionable that we do not afford Thompson the 
opportunity to test such crucial evidence before a district court 
judge. As some of my colleagues in the majority surely recognize, 
the fact that it now appears inevitable that Thompson's execution 
will go forward is truly a travesty of justice. Although I respect the 
majority's belief that it is bound by precedent and statute to reach 
the decision it does, I simply do not agree that the law requires that 
result.81 
 
Or yet more starkly, as Judge Martin wrote in a dissenting opinion in a capital 
case: 
 
This state of affairs I find unconscionable, even as I remain bound 
to apply the laws of this court and of the Supreme Court. . . . “[It] 
is not justice. It is caprice.” . . . Jason Getsy and John Santine are 
not hypothetical players in a criminal law final exam. They are real 
people who committed real crimes, indeed, the same crimes. That 
Getsy will be put to death while Santine will be spared, and that 
the law (at least according to the majority) actually sanctions this 
result, makes it virtually impossible for me to answer in the 
affirmative what Justice Blackmun viewed as the fundamental 
question . . . -namely, does our system of capital punishment 
“accurately and consistently determine” which defendants 
“deserve” to die and which do not?82 
 
A middle road position on conscience and adherence to precedent is that 
of following precedent, but, as a matter of fulfillment of conscientious obligation, 
explicitly signaling to the legislature, as the proper authority, to change the 
problematic precedent.83  This indicates a conscientious commitment not just to 
carrying out the role of the judge, but a broader commitment (appropriate to the 
trusteeship model) to work by appropriate means for the betterment of the law 
itself.  So, for example, one majority opinion following a relevant precedent 
further states that: “We can only hope that this decision appears to Congress as 
the distress flag that it is, and that Congress will act to limit, as only it is 
                                                          
81
 Thompson v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 918, 937 (9th Cir. 1998) (Reinhardt, concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
82
 Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 327 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
83
 See, e.g., Ill. Dept. of Rev. v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1985) (unanimous panel 
opinion); United States v. Robinson, 110 F.3d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., concurring); 
Gonzales v. Keisler, 251 Fed. Appx. 435, *1 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
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empowered to, the statute's application to cases such as the one before us now.”84  
A concurring opinion along similar substantive lines uses different and more vivid 
language, laying out the charge of Congressional responsibility for the current 
state of the law, concluding: “Unfortunately, Congress has taken away the court's 
ability to use its informed discretion in these matters, placing any discretion 
instead in the prosecution. Under existing law, one can only hope that prosecutors 
will use that discretion wisely.”85  Finally, one example of a dissent in this same 
vein involves a much more direct plea: “As I have said before, ‘I pray that soon 
the good men and women in our Congress will ameliorate the plight of families 
like the [petitioners] and give us humane laws that will not cause the 
disintegration of such families.’”86  All of these examples, whether in majority, 
concurrence, or dissent, underscore a desire for the system to get the law right, 
even if it is beyond the scope of the judge’s own authority to achieve that directly. 
Some might question even the relatively mild and restrained approach of 
incorporating and expressing conscientious views into opinions as being beyond 
the proper scope of the judicial role.  However, where it is a matter of the special 
perspective from the bench that reveals unanticipated problems or inconsistent 
results in the application of established law, this is a valuable contribution that a 
judge may make, and a written opinion is an appropriate place to do it.  While 
placement of such an expression in a majority opinion is unobjectionable, the best 
approach, perhaps, is placement in a concurrence, where it marks an attitude of 
compliance and restraint, while using the rhetorical device of a separate opinion 
to draw special attention to the issue.  Where a judge genuinely believes that 
faithfulness to institutional conscience requires a different result than that reached 
by the majority, a dissent may well be appropriate, despite any signals it sends to 
the public about potential instability of the law.   
 
C.  Separation of Powers 
 
 Turning to issues of separation of powers, there is of course general 
consensus on the basic role and responsibilities of the court with regard to 
separation of powers, but there is inconsistency in how judges view the specific 
boundaries of the separation in any given case, and thus there is inconsistency in 
the expression of institutional conscience in this area.  There are distinctions, for 
instance, among those cases in which the “conscientious” view indicates some 
measure of regret that the court must restrain itself from further action, those that 
assert separation of powers more neutrally as a factor that leaves only a limited 
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 Ill. Dept. of Rev. v. Phillips, 771 F.2d 312, 317 (7th Cir. 1985). 
85
 United States v. Robinson, 110 F.3d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., concurring). 
86
 Gonzales v. Keisler, 251 Fed. Appx. 435, *1 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (citation 
omitted). 
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role for judicial conscience, and those that deny that restraint is required, asserting 
instead that an aspect of conscientious judging is to take on whatever is even 
arguably within the judicial province, in order to do justice, rather than ceding too 
easily whatever control another branch might take an interest in. 
 Straightforward (even unanimous) opinions in the first category might 
make reference to separation of powers as a matter of conscience along these 
lines: 
 
Using estoppel as a shield implies nothing less than frustrating the 
government's authority to enforce valid laws. We cannot in good 
conscience accept a broad rule that prevents the sovereign from 
enforcing valid laws for no better reason than that a government 
official has performed his enforcement duties negligently. It does 
not overstate the case to say that such a rule would risk embroiling 
the judiciary in the Executive Branch's duty faithfully to execute 
the law and thereby would raise separation of powers concerns.87  
 
The same sort of statements may be found where the concern about overstepping 
bounds relates to the legislative branch: 
 
We can only conclude, as did the trial court, that the Congress 
intended to permit the taxpayer to obtain the benefit, taxwise, only 
of so much of the cost of construction of, or improvements to, a 
new house as the taxpayer had constructed and used within the 
eighteen month period herein applicable. We cannot in good 
conscience rewrite the statute as though it include the words 
‘contractual liabilities incurred during the 18 months period.’ The 
desire of the Congress to provide finality to the deferment 
provisions of Section 112(n) must regretfully be respected. Any 
relief to taxpayers must lie with the legislative rather than the 
judicial branch of the government.88 
 
In this talk of rewriting statutes, one can see the desire on the part of the court to 
achieve the “right” result, as well as the fact that the desire is overridden by the 
conscientious institutional responsibility to leave the lawmaking function to the 
                                                          
87
 Dantran, Inc. v. United States Dept. of Labor, 171 F.3d 58, at 66 (1st Cir. 1999) (unanimous 
panel opinion) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).  Along similar lines, see, e.g., Rodos v. 
Michaelson, 527 F.2d 582, 585 (1st Cir. 1975) (unanimous panel opinion) (“In sum, we do not 
reach the question whether the legislature has disregarded the mandate of the Supreme Court, for 
we cannot, in good conscience, say that the Attorney General cannot stand on his rights.”) 
88
 Kern v. Granquist, 291 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir. 1961) (emphasis added) (majority opinion).  
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legislative branch.  The very fact that the struggle shows up in a majority opinion, 
though, shows just how strongly both forces pull on the judges who want to do the 
best within the bounds of their role.   
When a dissenting judge actually sees the applicable law as less 
constraining as a substantive matter, though, a separate opinion may suggest that 
the majority actually can follow the values they desired to fulfill in the first place:  
 
I respectfully dissent. While my brothers agree that the result to the 
taxpayer is ‘an example of inequities' in income tax laws, they do 
not feel able to reverse the case. The statute and the regulations all 
use the word ‘made’ as the critical word. In the context in which 
this word is used, it is ambiguous.89 
 
There is thus no difference between the judges here about what institutional 
conscience requires.  All of the judges on the panel here would surely agree that it 
is the conscientious obligation of the court to follow the law, whether they 
approve of it or not.  There is simply a difference of interpretation of the 
substantive law involved, so that where the law does permit the result that the 
judges prefer with reference to other institutional commitments, there may even 
be an institutional conscientious obligation to retain authority and not to defer to 
another branch. 
Some judges may write separately in cases where institutional 
responsibility must trump personal preference as an outlet to achieve a heightened 
expression of that conscientious constraint, but the institutional norms compel 
them to stay in their proper roles.  Thus Judge Van Graafeiland wrote, in a 
concurring opinion:  
 
I concur in this case with great reluctance and wish that I could do 
otherwise. It seems unconscionable to me that this seventy-four 
year old widow who lived with Joseph Thomas for forty-seven 
years and bore ten of his children is now to be branded an 
adulteress, with whatever ramifications to her and her children that 
may result from this adjudication. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 
41, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). However, 
we must apply the law as Congress wrote it, not as we would like 
to have had it written.90 
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 Kern v. Granquist, 291 F.2d 29, 33 (9th Cir. 1961) (Hamlin, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) . 
90
 Thomas v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1990) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added).  It is notable that in expressing this disagreement with the law, the judge cited 
one of his own prior dissenting opinions.  Repeated conscientious dissents are discussed further 
infra at Section III.G. 
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Here we can see the judge’s personal views on the issue before the court in the 
transparent language about reluctance and wishing that the law could be 
otherwise.  The fact that these views are not hidden may even add to the judge’s 
credibility; and certainly in light of the accompanying explanation of why the 
result cannot be otherwise in light of the controlling law, the opinion will support 
a better understanding of the decisionmaking process.   
In a concurrence in a case involving sentencing, there was a further 
reference, not just to Congressional control over the law, but to the fact that 
Congress had acted specifically to remove the relevant power of the judiciary that 
had existed before:   
 
The contrast between that punishment and Robinson's, in light of 
the relative culpability, is unconscionable.  Unfortunately, 
Congress has taken away the court's ability to use its informed 
discretion in these matters, placing any discretion instead in the 
prosecution. Under existing law, one can only hope that 
prosecutors will use that discretion wisely.91 
 
This example demonstrates the use of conscientious expression of institutional 
responsibility to defend judicial territory, but it remains restrained in that it 
implicates no action in trying to take that territory by force – this remains, placed 
as it is in a concurring opinion, merely a matter of expression, not action.  Along 
quite similar lines, a unanimous panel opinion from the Eleventh Circuit includes 
the following statement: 
 
Congress, in a proper exercise of its legislative power, has decided 
that murder, like thefts from interstate commerce and the 
counterfeiting of securities, qualifies as racketeering activity. This, 
of course, ups the ante for RICO violators who personally would 
not contemplate taking a human life. Whether there is a moral 
imbalance in the equation of thieves and counterfeiters with 
murderers is a question whose answer lies in the halls of 
Congress, not in the judicial conscience.92 
 
There are times, though, when that regret about the practical limitations 
imposed by the doctrine of separation of powers, is apparently insufficient as an 
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 United States v. Robinson, 110 F.3d 1320, 1329 (8th Cir. 1997) (Heaney, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
92
 United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 905 (11th Cir. 1978) (unanimous panel opinion) (emphasis 
added). 
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expression of the judicial conscience, and a judge feels compelled to dissent. 93  
Taking on directly the issues presented by the role of empathy in the potential 
desire of a court to resolve a question of law differently from the legislature, 
Judge Moore wrote:  
 
The proponents of the ‘fraudulent concealment’ doctrine have 
overwhelming arguments in their favor- mostly emotional. To 
reward ‘wrongdoers who are successful in cloaking their unlawful 
activities with secrecy through cunning, deceptive and clandestine 
practices' and then ‘when their machinations are discovered’ to 
give to them ‘the shield of the statute of limitations to bar redress 
by those whom they have victimized’ would appear to be 
unconscionable. . . .  Another court chose to believe that ‘Congress 
did not intend that co-conspirators could spin and weave an 
impenetrable shroud of fraudulent concealment to cloak their 
illegal acts and then fraudulently render themselves immune with 
the shield of the statute of limitations to bar redress by those who 
are the victims of their conspiratorial machinations.’ . . .  But 
equally unconscionable, however, would be the case of the poor 
widow who, left penniless upon the death of her spouse caused by 
the gross negligence of some malefactor, has failed to bring an 
action within the prescribed statutory period. . . . It may well be 
that a ‘discovery’ or ‘fraudulent concealment’ amendment should 
be added to § 4B but the public policy and the morals issues which 
are involved in such legislation should be for the Congress to 
resolve- not the courts. Otherwise the courts in addition to their 
other endeavors assume a veto power over Congressional 
enactments whenever their views on such issues differ with those of 
Congress.94 
 
This kind of straightforward attempt to put the issue on the table and explain 
where the law stands and what can and cannot happen to change it is of 
tremendous value.  Acknowledgment of difficult issues and transparency of 
reasoning are themselves the fulfillment of the conscientious obligations imposed 
by the judicial role for the integrity and proper functioning of the institution. 
It is not just the questions of substantive law that raise institutional 
conscientious concerns – courts may also raise conscientious institutional 
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 Such expressions, in which the personal conscience contends closely with the institutional 
conscience, are discussed further infra at Section IV.C. 
94
 Atlantic City Electric Co. v. General Electric Co., 312 F.2d 236, 241-42, 244 (2d Cir. 1962) 
(Moore, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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concerns about pragmatic questions of judicial resources as they implicate 
separation of powers issues, as in this excerpt from a unanimous panel opinion: 
 
However, the vindication of almost every legal right has an impact 
on the allocation of scarce resources. And the courts, while mindful 
of the impact of remedies upon persons not before them, can 
hardly permit the legal rights of litigants to turn upon the alleged 
inability of the defendant fully to meet his obligations to others. . . 
. We agree with the Second Circuit that the existence of similar 
orders in other jurisdictions supports the relief granted here, but 
also that it is likely that an ultimate, comprehensive solution to the 
problem of hearing delays may well require congressional action. . 
. . We cannot in good conscience, however, deny relief to the 
plaintiffs pending such action. We conclude that this case presents 
a justiciable controversy and turn accordingly to the question of 
whether the delays complained of have denied plaintiffs their right 
to a “reasonable . . . opportunity for a hearing.”95 
 
Here, once again, there is an acknowledgment of the difficulty facing the court in 
making a decision in the case before it, set in the context of broader institutional 
commitments to various entities, with the judge acting as trustee of the law, but 
still having limited authority within which to fulfill its trusteeship obligations.  
Talking about the mindfulness and the conscience of the court in the context of 
the proper allocation of its resources underscores for readers of the opinion the 
level of concern on the part of the court, and at the same time demonstrates its 
conscientious commitment to acting within its authority to do whatever it can to 
achieve the right outcome, both of which are helpful for public confidence.   
 
D.  Due Process  
 
Turning next to issues of due process, one sees at the most basic level of 
conscientious concern for the institution of the judicial system, a concern for 
staying within the bounds of certain bedrock procedural constraints.  So, for 
example, a per curiam opinion states plainly: “We cannot in good conscience 
affirm a summary judgment if we are not satisfied that the appellant had been 
given an opportunity upon notice to oppose the grant below.”96  But even 
seemingly basic or fundamental matters of due process can be fodder for judicial 
                                                          
95
 Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d 9, 18 (1st Cir. 1978) (unanimous panel opinion) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
96
 Hispanics for Fair and Equitable Reapportionment (H-FERA) v. Griffin, 958 F.2d 24, 25 (10th 
Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (emphasis added). 
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disagreement as when, for example, a dissenting opinion states: “It is just that I 
cannot in good conscience join in reversing a decision in which I see no error.”97  
Or, still straightforward, but with a bit more elaboration: “The government 
removed Tomas Mendez-Alcaraz . . . from this country based on a criminal 
conviction that violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Because such an unconscionable result 
cannot be affirmed, I dissent.”98   
Adding the extra component of prejudice (as a matter of practical 
unfairness), a panel opinion from the District of Columbia Circuit includes the 
following explanation of the role played by conscience:  
 
Yet our reading of the transcript is such as to convince us that the 
prosecutor stepped out of bounds, that the impact of this plain 
error, in the context of a close case, was probably so prejudicial 
that our judicial conscience calls upon us to reverse and remand 
for a new trial that can be conducted free of similar error.99 
 
Along similar lines, augmenting straightforward legal conclusions about due 
process with practical fairness concerns, Judge Clay wrote: “Allowing defendants 
to be tried and convicted under a knowingly unfair jury selection system in the 
Eastern District of Michigan is unconscionable; allowing Mr. Blair to be twice 
subjected to an unfair jury selection system would be even worse.”100  This 
example shows an expression of conscience that is still relatively matter-of-fact 
and straightforward.  In other examples, by contrast, there is a more deeply 
heartfelt plea directed at the important role played by the conscience of the court, 
as seen here in a dissenting opinion by Judge Altimari: 
 
It is a bitter irony that in this era in which totalitarian regimes are 
adopting the language of freedom and looking to the United States 
as a model of liberty and justice, we today find it acceptable that a 
man who has not been charged with a crime in this country may 
remain incarcerated here indefinitely. I have always believed that a 
major difference between our Constitution and those that speak of 
justice in bold terms, but fail to provide it in reality, is that our 
                                                          
97
 NRDC, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287, 293 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Nichols, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
98
 Mendez-Alcaraz v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 842, 845 (9th Cir. 2006) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
99
 King v. United States, 372 F.2d 383, 390 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (emphasis added). 
100
 United States v. Blair, 214 F.3d 690, 703 (6th Cir. 2000) (Clay, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
 
34 
 
Constitution provides for a judicial branch that is charged with the 
task of safeguarding individuals' rights, be they citizens or not. 
Concededly, there is a difference between the rights of citizens as 
compared to those of non-citizens. The facts of this case, however, 
clearly transcend these differences. Ultimately, it is judges who 
must give substantive content to the meaning of the Constitution. 
Thus, I cannot in good conscience sit idly by and allow the Due 
Process Clause to become mere words. Because I believe that the 
Due Process Clause will not permit an indefinite confinement, or 
even the confinement for eight years, of an individual who has not 
been criminally charged and is merely awaiting deportation, I 
would reverse the judgment of the district court and remand with 
instructions to the court to set appropriate bail.101 
 
The mixture of use of both singular pronouns and collective references to judges 
here shows a heightened personal aspect to what is, in substantive terms, clearly 
an appeal to institutional conscience, demonstrating that these are not wholly 
objective matters, but ones well within the bounds of the role that concern 
individual occupants of the judicial role quite deeply. 
Still other examples from various contexts show that some judges see it as 
clearly within the court’s province to consider questions of morality in the 
assessment of due process.  Judge Lay, on the Eighth Circuit, put this in vivid 
terms, and expressed it in terms of judicial conscience:  
 
The most degrading, humiliating experience any human being, 
white or red, rich or poor, intelligent or not, can endure is a 
deprivation of one's personal liberty. To permit this under the 
circumstances existing here without any legal representation 
whatsoever is a mockery of the law itself. Before anyone forfeits 
his life or liberty, he should at least be given a meaningful 
opportunity to resort to the law which abhors forfeiture without 
proof of factual guilt and without positive indication of the 
existence of power of the committing authority. This to me is the 
essence of due process. I cannot in good conscience subscribe to 
the proposition that Nelson Miner has been afforded this 
protection.102 
 
                                                          
101
 Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 214 (2d Cir. 1991) (Altimari, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
102
 United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 428 F.2d 623, 639 (8th Cir. 1970) (Lay, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added). 
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Here the blending of the objective assertions with the ultimate resort to the 
personal perspective shows room for conscientious disagreement on matters of 
legal interpretation at the same time that it shows the deep importance of these 
issues to the judges who deal with them. 103 
There can be somewhat muddled and therefore potentially confusing 
language in the due process context that seems to suggest resort to one aspect of 
conscientious concern when the content of the expression betrays it really 
addresses another.  One example in this category states specifically as an 
“individual opinion” what is most certainly also (if not instead) a view about 
institutional responsibility with regard to fairness and justice in the predictability 
of the application of the law.  Judge Boreman, in part concurrence, part dissent, 
explains this matter of conscience as follows: 
 
It is my individual opinion that changing the established rules in 
the middle of the game is unjust, unfair, and inconsistent with the 
operation of a viable system of legal precedents, particularly to a 
taxpayer such as this one with a relatively small amount at stake. 
The controlling law of this Circuit, as it existed at the time of 
taxpayer's transaction, should be applied and taxpayer should have 
the right to any tax benefit available to it under Pridemark. It is 
unconscionable to hold otherwise. In all fairness and justice I 
cannot be persuaded to join in placing the taxpayer in such an 
unfavorable and unreasonable position by a denial of prospective 
application of our decision which definitely changes the rules of 
the game.104 
 
The identification of this expression as an “individual opinion” is trumped by the 
judge’s resort to principles of basic operation of the legal system.  The insistence 
on applying the controlling law of the jurisdiction, though it may be a principle to 
                                                          
103
 Some seventy years earlier, another judge on the same circuit made similar substantive 
statements about the role of the courts, not using terms of ‘conscience,’ but rather of morality, 
justice, and fair dealing.  See Evans-Snider-Buel v. McFadden, 105 F. 293, 301-02 (8th Cir. 1900) 
(Sanborn, J., dissenting) (“When called upon to resolve questions like the one in hand, the courts 
have never deemed it necessary to close their eyes to the equities of the case, but have frequently 
permitted their judgments to be influenced by the consideration that that which the legislature has 
done in the way of disturbing rights acquired under existing laws was morally right, and in 
accordance with justice and fair dealing. . . . It is our privilege and duty, therefore, in determining 
whether a vested right has been violated and whether congress exceeded its just power in 
validating the interpleader's mortgage, to consider whether its action was dictated by a sense of 
justice, and was right when viewed from a purely moral standpoint.”) (emphasis added). 
104
 Of Course, Inc. v. C.I.R., 499 F.2d 754, 761 (4th Cir. 1974) (Boreman, J.,concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (emphasis added). 
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which the judge does feel personally committed, is clearly not a predominantly 
personal commitment, but rather an institutional one to which the judge, as a 
matter of the role, has bought in.  One must consider, however, the extra 
rhetorical force given in such a situation by resort to expression of this matter as a 
personal rather than a purely institutional conscientious commitment.105   
This takes us back to the bottom-line principle in the due process cases, 
which is ultimately about fidelity to the law, and particularly on the part of judges, 
fidelity to Constitutional principles of due process, which lies at the core of their 
trusteeship responsibilities.  So, in a case containing discussion by the majority 
about the propriety of an appeal to jurors to play the role of community 
conscience,106 Judge Jones expressed a conscientious view along these quite 
straightforwardly institutional lines, focusing on the judicial obligation of fidelity 
to the Constitution: 
 
This dissent is compelled by the majority's validation of the 
unpardonable constitutional improprieties present in this record. 
The effect of this validation is an intolerable abandonment of 
substantive and procedural principles deeply rooted in Anglo 
Saxon and American constitutional jurisprudence. Stated in its 
most simple form, these principles are designed to protect 
individual rights from constitutional shortcuts. I dissent here 
because rather than upholding these principles, as courts are 
sworn to do, a grievous breakdown has occurred. . . . In this 
context, confidence in the outcome of Byrd's trial must be, and is, 
seriously undermined. One cannot, in good conscience, blink at 
such substantial constitutional impropriety with full 
comprehension of its deadly effects. In these circumstances, 
judicial neglect transforms the justice system into an accomplice to 
constitutional transgression.107 
 
This is the most basic of conscientious institutional commitments.  As Justice 
Holmes and so many others have said, the job of the judge is to apply the law.  
Compliance with constitutional principles must be foremost in the judge’s 
fulfillment of the trusteeship obligations of the law.  Certainly there will be 
disagreements about the particular shape and application of those constitutional 
principles, but as long as the judge’s conscientious commitment is to follow 
constitutional principles, where judicial conscience is concerned, the obligation is 
fulfilled.  
                                                          
105
 See discussion infra at Section VI.B. 
106
 Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 541, 538-39 (6th Cir. 2000). 
107
 Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 548 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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It is noteworthy that all of the examples in this section were from dissents, 
or partial dissents, rather than from concurrences.  This is significant in that it 
demonstrates the difference between those cases that are about the restraint 
required, for example, by adherence to precedent or separation of powers 
principles.  Due process cases are more clearly about perspective within the 
bounds of the judicial role, where there is less internal argument about constraint 
by the law, and more about judgment in the application of the law as it is clearly 
established.  There is more room for perfectly proper disagreement among a panel 
of judges as to what institutional conscience requires, and thus more range for 
dissenting opinions.   
 
 E.  Burdens on Courts and Their Resources 
 
 As trustees not just of the law, but also of the institution of the courts, 
judges are ideally situated to observe how their resources of both time and money 
are consumed and what strains those resources.  Often judges agree on how these 
matters play into the law of the case,108 but there are a number of concurrences, 
part concurrences and part dissents, and pure dissents that make reference to, or 
even rely on concerns about conscientious responsibility for the resources of the 
institution.  In the pure concurrences, the idea is often there to add an indicator of 
the broader implications or ramifications of the majority’s (correct) application of 
law.  For example, in a recent case regarding prescription drug benefits, Judge 
Fletcher wrote in concurrence: 
 
I concur in the opinion, which carefully and painstakingly analyzes 
the claims. I add this concurrence simply to vent my frustration. 
What have Uhms' counsel accomplished for the Uhms, for justice, 
or for the law? . . . Today the Uhms receive the prescription drug 
benefits to which they are entitled. But not as a result of this 
lawsuit. The cost to the court system and to the Uhms is 
unconscionable. A bit of common sense and attention to the 
available administrative remedies should have been applied. 
Instead we have an opinion with endless pages of legal analysis, 
                                                          
108
 See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodriguez, 943 F.2d 104, 110 (1st Cir. 1991) (“We cannot in good 
conscience burden the courts with litigation that is plainly unmeritorious.”) (emphasis added); 
Brown v. United States, 890 F.2d 1329, 1347 (5th Cir. 1989) (“We cannot in good conscience 
remand this case to the district court for further fact finding. This litigation, which has already 
consumed countless hours of judicial resources over its seven year life, at some point must end. 
That point has been reached.”) (emphasis added). 
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months of study and delay, and a determination that no benefit can 
be awarded to the Uhms.109 
 
Along similar lines, but with perhaps an even broader perspective about the 
institution of the judiciary and those bearing its costs, Judge Garth wrote a 
concurring opinion in a case about a denial of disability benefits, at least in part so 
that he could note how an additional burden on administrative law judges would 
put an “unconscionable” burden on the taxpayers.110  In a case about attorney’s 
fees, Judge Bright concurred in part, but noting attorney abuse of court resources, 
found that the problem of unconscionable delay in getting to a resolution of the 
case in hand and the attendant waste of resources rose to the level of requiring a 
dissent.111  And there are yet more examples.112   
There are, of course, pure dissents on such matters as well.  One notable 
example comes from an en banc case from the Eleventh Circuit, which drew 
multiple separate opinions, including a dissent which noted that the burden of 
considering the writ at issue was a moral one, and could not be left to concerns 
                                                          
109
 Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1158 (9th Cir. 2010) (Fletcher, B., J., 
concurring) (emphasis added). 
110
 Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1189 (3d Cir. 1992) (Garth, J., concurring) (“… if we 
require administrative law judges to give weight or credence to such unprofessional reports, it 
cannot help but impose an unconscionable strain on the taxpaying public-a public which is already 
burdened with enormous social costs arising from health care needs, disability benefits and the 
like.”) 
111
 Jaquette v. Black Hawk , 710 F.2d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 1983) (Bright, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part): 
I concur in the court's affirmance of the district court's award of Jaquette's 
attorneys fees. I would not, however, remand the case to the district court. This 
case has already consumed an inordinate amount of judicial, as well as lawyers', 
time and effort. Simply stated, it is time to lay this case to rest. . . . After 
reviewing the record, it is evident that this case did not require such enormous 
expenditures of time and money. I do not denegrate in any way the importance 
of the relief Jaquette obtained. However, it is unconscionable that this case 
dragged on for nearly three years before the parties reached an agreement which, 
according to Jaquette, would have been acceptable at the very beginning of the 
litigation. . . . Although I share the majority's outrage regarding the inexcusable 
amounts of time and money expended on this case, I dissent from that portion of 
the majority's opinion remanding the case to the district court. After what is now 
nearly four years of the litigants exchanging charges and countercharges, I can 
see no possible benefit of further prolonging this case. 
112
 See United States v. Whitson, 587 F.2d 948, 956 (9th Cir. 1978) (Kilkenny, J., conurring in part 
and dissenting in part) (“I am in complete disagreement with what is said in footnote 6, page 525, 
of the majority's opinion [regarding trial court’s obligation to carefully control the scope of cross-
examination by prosecutor]. This language places an unconscionable burden on the shoulders of a 
trial judge.”) 
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about judicial efficiency or economy.113  Finally, there are some expressions of 
judicial conscience that indicate an institutional concern or responsibility for the 
practical enforceability of a burden they place on other players in the justice 
system.114  For example, even though the judge in one case acknowledged that the 
majority had a defensible position on the law, he could not “in good conscience” 
join the opinion and in so doing subject police officers to the risks the majority’s 
rule would create for them.115  This is a good example of a case in which there is 
an individual expression that underscores institutional responsibility. 
 
F. Credibility and Reputation 
 
 Courts also express conscientious responsibility for the maintenance of the 
credibility and reputation of the judicial system itself, and many take advantage of 
separate opinions to do so.  For example, there are cases in which concerns about 
strong public feeling about a particular area of substantive law (such as the death 
penalty) raises conscientious concern for institutional legitimacy, and thus 
counsels particularly careful explanation of the decisionmaking process and 
institutional insistence on pursuing whatever process will best ensure that the 
court gets the law right and applies it in a non-arbitrary manner.  These are 
expressions of institutional conscience that are centrally and openly concerned 
with ultimate justice, and in order to preserve the credibility and reputation of the 
court, the judges who write these opinions are willing to take their fellow 
panelists to task for any perceived shortcomings in the fulfillment of the 
obligations of the role.  So, for example, Judge Jones wrote:  
 
In this context, confidence in the outcome of Byrd's trial must be, 
and is, seriously undermined. One cannot, in good conscience, 
blink at such substantial constitutional impropriety with full 
comprehension of its deadly effects. In these circumstances, 
                                                          
113
 Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 375 (11th Cir. 1978) (Goldberg, J., dissenting): 
This is the moral burden we bear when we defer consideration of a petition for 
the Great Writ. This burden cannot possibly be supported by considerations of 
judicial economy and efficiency; an Atlas, not an Anchises, of a justification is 
needed to shoulder the burdens of the rule of complete exhaustion. A judge's 
time is precious, to be sure, but precious only in relation to the tasks the judge 
performs. In a habeas corpus case, we are dealing with human life and human 
liberty, precious commodities even in today's world of depreciated traditional 
values. I will not participate in the process of depreciating further human life 
and liberty by accepting the proposition that saving an hour or two of a judge's 
time justifies keeping a man locked behind the bars of a state penitentiary for a 
year or more. 
114
 United States v. Corona, 661 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1981) (Sneed, J., dissenting).  
115
 Id.  
DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
 
40 
 
judicial neglect transforms the justice system into an accomplice to 
constitutional transgression.116 
 
Along similar lines of underscoring the reality of the final significance of these 
decisions, but adding a particular concern for keeping within proper bounds, 
giving deference to the proper decisionmaker on a given issue, Judge Heaney 
wrote in dissent: 
 
Had the jury been apprised of Lingar's life circumstances, there 
exists a reasonable probability that it would have found mitigating 
circumstances to outweigh aggravating circumstances and 
therefore would have voted for life imprisonment. Because I 
cannot in good conscience join in the majority's certainty that this 
information would have made no difference to the question of 
whether Stanley David Lingar should be put to death by the state, I 
respectfully dissent.117 
 
Along similar lines, a number of judges take opportunities to speak directly to the 
importance of full review or full process that ought to be (or ought to have been) 
afforded on a particular question, and the reality of the circumstances that can 
make it important to get it right in the first instance.  Often they speak of these 
concerns in terms of institutional conscience, especially in the context of dissents 
from denials of rehearing en banc, further discussed below.118 
On the theme of potentially unjust outcomes, and the matters of judicial 
conscience that can play into them, some cases display judicial efforts to 
underscore the need for open acknowledgment that those before the court are real 
people suffering real consequences.  The Getsy case quoted above offers an 
example of a judicial reminder that these are real people facing real (and final) 
effects.119  The dissenting opinion there urged judges to be careful to remember 
and carefully consider the practical effects of their rulings, rather than seeing 
them in the abstract or as “hypothetical players in a criminal law final exam.”120  
Along similar lines, there are times when a judge will, as a matter of institutional 
conscience note either what that judge believes to be a lack of credibility in the 
majority’s interpretation or specific application of the law – that the court is 
                                                          
116
 Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 548 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
117
 Lingar v. Bowersox, 176 F.3d 453, 466 (8th Cir. 1999) (Heaney, J., dissenting). 
118
 See discussion infra at Section III.G. 
119
 Getsy v. Mitchell, 495 F.3d 295, 327 (6th Cir. 2007) (Martin, J., dissenting). 
120
 Id. 
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imposing a meaning that does not make sense as a practical matter,121 or imposing 
a burden that is unrealistic.122  Such references to judicial conscience again may 
be intended to speak to concerns about the development and maintenance of 
public confidence essential to the legitimacy of judicial decisions. 
It is not always in dissents that these expressions of institutional 
conscience occur with regard to the effort to maintain the credibility and 
reputation of the court.  Majority opinions on issues of due process, for instance, 
often afford opportunities for matters of conscience to come into the analysis for 
the benefit of the court’s credibility.  Writing for the majority in one death penalty 
case, Judge Rawlinson concluded:  “We simply cannot in good conscience 
continue to send men to their deaths without ensuring that their cases were not 
prejudiced by inadequate legal representation at any phase of the proceedings.”123  
It is noteworthy that this statement appeared in the context of a case that drew 
separate opinions from each of the three judges on the panel.124  Judge Kleinfeld 
took a relatively detached and pragmatic view in his part-concurrence, part-
dissent in the case.  Emphasizing the limited and discretionary nature of federal 
                                                          
121
 See In re Ruffalo, 370 F.2d 447 (6th Cir. 1966). 370 F.2d 447, 461 (Edwards, J., dissenting) (“I 
cannot in good conscience agree that the making of such small loans as these to two admittedly 
impoverished widows represented purchasing an interest in litigation”), reversed by In re Ruffalo, 
390 U.S. 544 (1968) (on grounds of lack of notice to attorney of potential ramification of 
disbarment for offense).  
122
 See United States v. Corona, 661 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1981) (Sneed, J., dissenting): 
This decision, however, will not deter officers who find themselves in a position 
similar to that in which Officer Wolfe found himself in this case. Nor should it. 
Officers so situated will not risk being slain on a back street because of this 
decision nor can I in good conscience ask them to assume such risks. The 
incidence of murdered policemen is too high to dismiss the risk lightly. The 
depth of my feeling can be evidenced by my affirmation that had I been Officer 
Wolfe I too would have stopped and conducted a pat-down search of the 
appellant. 
(emphasis added).   Courts may show a similar conscientious concern for others within their own 
branch, but playing different roles.  So, for example, one appellate judge dissented in 
conscientious objection to the unhelpful standard the court would impose on the lower courts.  See 
Radovich v. Cunard S.S. Co., 364 F.2d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 1966) (Kaufman, J., dissenting): 
Since my brothers agree that it is difficult to see any real distinctions between 
cases where the stevedore lost and those where he won …, I cannot, in good 
conscience, become a party to simply an exercise in skillful rhetoric- and inflict 
on the district court the impossible task of dealing with words and phrases that 
are like beads of quicksilver. 
(citations omitted). 
123
 Stanley v. Schriro, 598 F.3d 612, 615 (9th Cir. 2010) (Rawlinson, J., majority opinion) 
(emphasis added). 
124
 In concurrence, Judge Fletcher did not speak to any issues of conscience, but rather took up 
other issues of legal interpretation relating to the claims that were affirmed.  Id. at 626-28 
(Fletcher, J., concurring). 
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evidentiary hearings on state habeas petitions, he walked carefully through a very 
practical assessment of why, on the facts of the case, it makes sense that their 
review should be limited and discretionary.125  Responding to the dissent, 
however, despite the dissent’s lack of any reference to conscience, morality, or 
any other personal response to the case before the panel, the majority further 
explained its position:  
 
There is no doubt that the facts of this case are repulsive. But that 
is true for every case where the death penalty is imposed. If the 
resolution of this case rested on the relative heinousness of the 
offense, we would have no quarrel with our colleague in dissent. 
However, our charge is to look at the merits of the legal issues 
raised rather than to focus on the degree to which we are repulsed 
by the inevitably grisly details of the case.126 
 
Here the judge writing for the majority is careful to indicate an understanding of 
the realities of the situation, the significance of the majority’s decision, and how it 
may look in ordinary human terms.  However, the greater weight goes, as the 
majority opinion shows, to the legal requirements that must constrain the court’s 
decisionmaking.  The acknowledgement and the transparency of the reasoning in 
all three opinions in this case may well be quite helpful to readers seeking to 
understand the law, the outcome, and the reasoning process used by the judges, 
such that it may improve confidence in that decisionmaking process and in its 
results. 
The examples in this section demonstrate a basic matter of conscientious 
judicial concern for the credibility and reputation of the courts.  These are 
expressions of conscience that make clear the judicial commitment to be honest 
and transparent in their decisionmaking process, to be clear-sighted about (and not 
too detached from) from the ‘real-life’ significance of the decisions they make, 
and to have a properly restrained understanding and practice with regard to their 
own power and authority.  These conscientious efforts should bolster public 
confidence in the judiciary as trustees of the law. 
 
  G.  Dissents From Denials of Rehearing En Banc 
 
 One last category of expressions of specifically institutional conscience, 
with an eye firmly fixed on the judicial role itself, and the role of the judiciary 
                                                          
125
 Id. at 628 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Underscoring the fairness 
issue, Judge Kleinfeld further emphasized the fact that so much time passed before anyone asked 
for a hearing.   
126
 Id. at 616 (Rawlinson, J., majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
 
43 
 
more broadly as an important player in the legal system, is that of dissents from 
denials of rehearing en banc.  These are often focused on matters not necessarily 
tied to a specific case, but tied instead to what a rule made or applied in a certain 
case may mean more broadly for future obligations of the courts at various levels.  
The concerns in this category of institutional concern range from resource 
allocation and timing issues, to the practical workings of procedures, to concern 
for the reputation of the law or the justice system as a whole, to concern for the 
legitimacy of the judiciary in recognizing evolving standards over time, and so on.  
It is true that sometimes these opinions simply reflect a different view of the law 
and do so in a relatively straightforward manner,127 and some though 
straightforward take perhaps a more urgent tone,128 but still others do speak 
directly to the larger issue of the conscientious obligation owed by a whole court 
in providing review of decisions by panels of its members and the attendant 
stability and finality of that kind of review.  So, for example, Judge Reinhardt, 
joined by Judge Pregerson, wrote in dissent (excerpted here at length due to the 
depth of relevant analysis) in a death penalty case, explaining the many layers of 
conscientious responsibility of the judiciary: 
 
Preliminarily, I think it important to discuss briefly one aspect of 
our en banc process and its relationship to the public's right to be 
fully informed on the subject of capital punishment. The en banc 
process allows the full court the opportunity to decide whether a 
three-judge decision upholding a death sentence correctly 
construes the Constitution and correctly applies controlling legal 
precedent. Yet, under our court rules, when a suggestion that the 
court hear a case en banc is rejected we do not announce the 
division. All we say is that a majority of the non-recused active 
judges failed to vote in favor of such a hearing. That tells the 
public little. We do not reveal whether the vote was close or even 
whether a majority of the eligible judges voted against en banc 
review. Whatever the wisdom of that rule in general-and I believe 
the answer is that the rule is wrong under all circumstances-it 
                                                          
127
 See, e.g., Cammack v. Waihee, 944 F.2d 466 (9th Cir. 1991) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from 
denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (on issue of whether good Friday can be considered a 
secular holiday). 
128
 Hohri v. United States, 793 F.2d 304, 304-313 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Bork, J., dissenting from 
denial of petition for rehearing en banc):  
This case illustrates the costs to the legal system when compassion displaces 
law. The panel majority says it is not too late for justice to be done. But we 
administer justice according to law. Justice in a larger sense, justice according to 
morality, is for Congress and the President to administer, if they see fit, through 
the creation of new law. 
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clearly does not serve the public interest in death penalty cases. I 
believe the people have a right to know if an individual is being 
executed notwithstanding the fact that a substantial number of 
judges who have examined the constitutionality of the state's 
proposed action believe further judicial review is necessary-and I 
believe that there is no justification for concealing the actual 
division in the court. There are good reasons why history should 
fully record the judicial votes in death penalty cases. 
One of the continuing questions regarding both the propriety 
and constitutionality of the death penalty is whether it is arbitrary. 
Can the death penalty be applied in a manner that clearly and 
objectively separates those who should be put to death from those 
who are allowed to live? Is the law so clearly discernible that men 
and women of good will can in good conscience say-yes, a fair-
minded individual would necessarily determine that the law 
classifies this case as one in which the taking of the defendant's life 
is proper? If such an objective classification cannot be made, 
should we not continue to question seriously the fairness and 
legitimacy of the process, and its application in particular cases? 
… Arbitrariness in the application of the death penalty is neither an 
abstract nor a closed subject. … Many jurists and other persons 
sensitive to individual rights believe that McCleskey's execution 
was legally indefensible and morally unconscionable. Others 
simply argue that the determination that McCleskey should die was 
based on so uncertain and questionable a legal foundation that, at 
the very least, serious questions are raised as to whether the death 
penalty is being enforced in an arbitrary manner.… 
En banc review is a critical safeguard in the capital punishment 
process. Ordinary concerns regarding judicial administration 
should not influence our judgment whether to grant further review 
to death penalty decisions that may be flawed by substantial errors 
of law. We have a special responsibility in death penalty cases to 
see that the Constitution and applicable statutes are fully complied 
with. There is no margin for error. In capital punishment appeals, 
neither judicial or administrative convenience nor any other 
reason can justify our deferring to the views of a three-judge panel 
if the majority of the court might, after further study, conclude that 
the conviction or sentence is unlawful. When a human life is at 
stake, we should provide en banc review in all cases in which 
legitimate questions exist concerning a panel's decision in favor of 
the state.  Harris most certainly qualifies under that standard, as he 
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would under any reasonable test. Common decency and fairness-as 
well as due process-require that we rehear his case en banc. … I 
deeply regret that we have decided otherwise.129 
 
In this case, as in other examples that will follow, there is a persistent and direct 
attention given to conscientious institutional responsibility as a matter of the very 
procedure at issue. Petitions for rehearing en banc get most basically at the 
question of whether a panel has properly adhered to the law, has exercised its 
authority properly, fulfilled its obligations – in short whether, in their role of 
exercising judgment, they have gotten the result right.  This is the kind of question 
that lies at the true core of the appellate judicial role, and thus the reasoning courts 
engage in when deciding whether to grant a rehearing very often explicitly draws 
on institutional conscience, as exemplified in Judge Reinhardt’s opinion here.  
That conscientious commitment runs both to the larger picture of the place of 
rehearings en banc in the shape of the judicial task and to the particular procedure 
and outcome in this case.  The judge shows significant concern for both. 
Furthermore, one sees here a judge conscientiously committed to ensuring 
that the right process is used in getting to a just result, a judge committed to 
consideration of public appearance and perspective on issues involving significant 
moral questions relevant to society as a whole, to value issues of life and death 
over administrative or resource-based concerns of the institution, and one sees all 
of this expressed as something that is felt deeply by the Judge Reinhardt as an 
individual occupant of the role (along with Judge Pregerson, who joined the 
opinion).  Here we see both plural and singular pronouns, both references to core 
commitments of the institution (such as the need for due process) and references 
to the judge’s personal views on common decency and fairness, references to his 
own beliefs and regrets.130  He takes this matter personally, as well as 
professionally.131 
Furthermore, to show the variety of perspectives on institutional 
conscience and how it may play into the decisionmaking, Judge Alarcon wrote a 
shorter dissent in the same case, also making reference to conscience, but focused 
on a different institutional commitment:  
 
                                                          
129
 Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1539-45 (9th Cir. 1990) (Reinhardt, J., dissenting from 
denial of petition for rehearing en banc).    
130
 See also, along similar lines, Novak v. Beto, 456 F.2d 1303, 1304, 1308 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(Wisdom, J., dissenting from denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (“With deep distress and 
profound regret I note the refusal of a majority of the members of this Court to give en banc 
consideration to this case. . . .”). 
131
 For further discussion of intertwined expressions of institutional and personal conscience, see 
infra Section V. 
DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
 
46 
 
I decline to participate further in the unconscionable delays that 
have occurred in reaching a final determination in this matter. It is 
no wonder that Congress is presently reexamining the rules that 
permit state prisoners to seek federal habeas corpus relief. The 
Harris case is a textbook example of how the Great Writ can be 
abused.132 
 
Along similar lines, challenging the majority of the court as to the 
institutional responsibility of the court with regard to finding the right balance on 
matters of timing, in another case Judge Reinhardt launched another part-
concurrence-part-dissent by saying:  
 
I dissent from this court's refusal to stay Campbell's execution by 
hanging pending his filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari with 
the United States Supreme Court. Our denial of Campbell's request 
for a stay is in direct violation of the rules that govern the 
operation of this court. By our decision we pronounce our 
willingness to hang Campbell first and submit the serious 
constitutional issue he raises to the Supreme Court for decision 
later. So the Ninth Circuit returns, at least for now, to the rough 
Western justice of frontier days: Hang 'em first, ask questions 
later.133 
 
Similar concerns of judicial conscience with regard to timing issues, as well as 
issues about the need for full process and thus full review of death penalty cases 
in an en banc context were expressed in a concurrence and a dissent in a Sixth 
Circuit case.  Judge Moore, in concurrence, reiterated the unconscionability of the 
application of controlling law on timing grounds, because it had the effect of 
permitting the appellant’s execution to go forward “without ever having the 
opportunity to have a court consider the merits of his Eighth Amendment 
challenge to his method of execution, a method that a court may well find 
unconstitutional just a few short months following his death by lethal 
injection.”134  Judge Merritt, in dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc, also 
called the holding unconscionable in its expansion of the law, but explained in 
different terms: “The court's deceptive attempt to say that some unknown, 
                                                          
132
 Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 1497, 1546 (9th Cir. 1990) (Alarcon, J., dissenting from denial of 
petition for rehearing en banc) (emphasis added). 
133
 Campbell v. Wood, 20 F.3d 1050, 1051-52 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  The specific reference to judicial conscience in this opinion is discussed infra 
at Section V.A. 
134
 Getsy v. Strickland, 577 F.3d 320, 321 (2009) (Moore, J., concurring). 
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undescribed future case might not be time barred, if the challenged alterations are 
sufficiently egregious, improperly conflates the merits of the case with the statute 
of limitations, and is not even consistent with the Cooey II case or any other case 
in the legal canon.”135  These examples of both pragmatic concerns and more 
technical concerns about proper compliance with governing law show the variety 
of ways in which judicial conscience may come into play even within the same 
opinion, especially when rehearing en banc, and thus the clarification and 
settlement of a difficult issue of law, is at stake.   
 
H.  Conclusions on Expressions of Institutional Conscience 
 
 Expressions of true institutional conscience provide important added value 
to the readers of appellate judicial opinions, wherever they are placed.  Coming as 
they do from a uniquely informed perspective, and providing as they do a glimpse 
of the deeply felt concern for the responsibility embodied in the judicial role, they 
afford both useful input into the decisionmaking process and also a transparency 
that can enhance public confidence in the careful, thoughtful work of the 
judiciary. This value is only added, however, in situations in which there really is 
a matter worthy of conscientious concern, rather than routine practice.  If 
conscience were to be overplayed as a matter of institutional responsibility, it 
would lose its force for purposes of promoting public confidence.   Given the 
relative rarity with which federal appellate judges make these explicit references 
to conscientious concerns, however, overuse does not appear to be a problem. 
  
IV.  Expressions of Personal Conscience 
 
 A.  Basic Themes 
 
Turning to cases in which the focus of the expression of judicial 
conscience is a personal, rather than an institutional commitment, things look 
somewhat different.  As noted earlier, the use of the pronoun “I” or “we” is not 
dispositive in the determination of whether a judge’s expression is primarily 
personal or institutional.  One must look to the context, content, and tone of a 
statement of conscience in order to assess whether it fits into the personal or 
institutional category.136  Judges and commentators have weighed in on both sides 
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 Getsy v. Strickland, 577 F.3d 320, 321-22 (2009) (Merritt, J., dissenting). 
136
 See., e.g., Doherty v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 204, 214 (2d Cit. 1991) (Altimari, J., dissenting) 
(using “I” in conscientious statements about judicial responsibility with regard to substantive 
content of Due Process clause); United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 242-43 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(Coleman, J., concurring) (stating disagreement with decision about responsibility of courts in 
terms of personal experience with how they work); United States ex rel. Miner v. Erickson, 428 
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of the propriety question in this arena.  Given that it happens, however, that 
judges do sometimes resort to personal conscientious commitments and at times 
openly express those commitments in their written opinions, either in support of 
or against the relevant legal consideration, it is important to examine the concerns 
that are at issue in these instances.   
Where the expressions are about truly personal matters of conscience, as 
opposed to mixed matters of personal and institutional commitments, there is 
usually an accompanying expression of the judge’s straightforward opposition to 
the policy behind a given law.  Statements expressing personal conscientious 
commitments do occur in other contexts, but they often walk a fine line between 
the truly personal and what may just as easily be understood as a deeply-felt 
commitment to institutional responsibility that comes across as personal due to a 
basic disagreement, or difference in perspective, from those in the majority.137  
That muddy middle ground will be discussed further in the next section.138 
 
 B. Concurrences as Outlets for Expression Alone 
 
 Examples of truly personal conscience coming into play to express an 
individual judge’s opposition to the state of the law, or its application in a given 
case, appear in both concurrences and dissents.   They do not always indicate an 
intention to subvert the law – they are often simply outlets for a judge to state the 
disagreement, while still acting within the bounds of the law, and of the judicial 
role.  In such instances, the effect is much like what was seen in the institutional 
conscience cases relating to adherence to precedent that a judge found 
undesirable.  The difference is that the expression is more clearly a matter of 
personal judgment as opposed to institutional responsibility.  So, for example, 
Judge Craven wrote in a concurrence on a sentencing matter: 
                                                                                                                                                               
F.2d 623, 639 (8th Cir. 1970) (Lay, J., dissenting) (acknowledging personal perspective on what 
the law contemplates or is meant to afford). 
137
 One example here is that of the judge who sees the majority improperly extending a doctrine 
beyond the extent warranted.  See United States v. Weikert, 504 F.3d 1, 19-20 (1st Cir. 2007) 
(Stahl, J., dissenting) (It was said by Edmund Burke, “The true danger is when liberty is nibbled 
away, for expedients, and by parts.” I cannot, in good conscience, sign on to a decision that I 
believe provides the legal rationale for an enormous expansion of state intrusion into the most 
private of realms, without warrant, probable cause, or even suspicion.”)  Here the first person 
pronoun is used, and the conscientious commitment is clearly strongly felt by the judge as an 
individual, but the basis for the conscientious commitment is arguably institutional rather than 
truly personal.  Along similar lines, see Schlueter v. Varner, 384 F.3d 69, 79 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(Ambro, J., dissenting) (“I cannot in good conscience bury Schlueter's case before it sees the light 
of day. AEDPA confers on federal courts the authority equitably to toll its limitations period in the 
interest of justice. If any case is ripe for exercise of that power, this one is. Accordingly, I 
respectfully dissent.”)  
138
 See discussion infra at Section V. 
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I would dissent . . . but for Peterson. . . .  I think this outmoded 
decision, decided wrongly before I was born, is binding upon a 
panel of our court. I would en banc the case, overrule Peterson, 
vacate the sentence, and remand for resentencing. I am very 
strongly of the opinion that a trial judge may not properly impose a 
harsher sentence upon a defendant because he thinks the defendant 
lied on the witness stand. Such a practice will inevitably chill and 
hamper, if not ultimately destroy, the right to testify in one's own 
defense. It seems to me unconscionable that a defendant must run 
the risk of conviction of the offense charged and at the same time 
run the gauntlet of disbelief.139 
 
This shows us a judge who insists on preserving propriety in playing the judicial 
role, recognizing the binding authority of existing case law that will not permit a 
dissent in good faith, adhering to the responsibility of the role, but who takes the 
opportunity of writing separately to point out what he sees as being wrong with 
the substance and operation of that law.    
Judge Coleman, along similar lines, concurred in a Fifth Circuit case, 
United States v. Scruggs,140 to state his conscientious objection to the giving of 
Allen charges,141 recognizing that although they are firmly established in the law, 
his own experience as a trial judge taught him that they are not a good idea in 
practice.142  He wrote:  “At the risk, however, of being accused of an attempt to 
fight lost battles all over again, I must, in good conscience, again state my long-
held opposition to the use of the Allen charge….”143  That said, to be clear about 
the relationship between his own conscience and the force of the actual state of 
the law, Judge Coleman concluded, “Nothing I have said is to be construed as a 
criticism of the trial judge.  He acted well within the law as it presently stands in 
this Circuit.144 
 Judge Coleman does not stand alone in feeling compelled by personal 
conscience to speak up, despite well-entrenched legal authority that may stand 
against the legal issue in question.  Like the personal experience that drove Judge 
Coleman in Scruggs, quite often what seems to drive these types of statements of 
                                                          
139
 United States v. Moore, 484 F.2d 1284, 1288 (4th Cir. 1973) (Craven, J., concurring) (citations 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
140
 583 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1978). 
141
 An “Allen charge,” named after  the case of Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896), is 
effectively a direction from the trial judge to a jury to continue deliberations to avoid a mistrial. 
142
 United States v. Scruggs, 583 F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1978) (Coleman, J., concurring).  
143
 Id.  The judge went on to paint of the particular circumstances in the instant case that amplified 
the problems he saw with the Allen charge more generally.  Id. at 243. 
144
 Id. at 243. 
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personal conscience are matters that hit close to home with judges as matters of 
personal experience or individual understandings of morality, credibility, or 
justice.  A few examples will demonstrate the pull of personal conscientious 
commitment or responsibility to speak up for what they see as right.  For instance, 
Judge Van Graafeiland wrote in a concurring opinion:  
 
I concur in this case with great reluctance and wish that I could do 
otherwise. It seems unconscionable to me that this seventy-four 
year old widow who lived with Joseph Thomas for forty-seven 
years and bore ten of his children is now to be branded an 
adulteress, with whatever ramifications to her and her children that 
may result from this adjudication. See Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 
41, 49 (2d Cir. 1983) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting). However, 
we must apply the law as Congress wrote it, not as we would like 
to have had it written.145 
 
In this instance, the judge shows a respectful restraint in playing the judicial role, 
writing in concurrence to draw attention to the issue, but not trying to change the 
outcome or abdicate the judicial responsibility of applying the law as written.  
Along similar lines, underscoring considerations of practical fairness, Judge Will 
dissented in a trust law case, writing: 
 
Given the uncontested facts found by the District Court, my 
reading of Texas trust law and my understanding of the role of a 
federal appellate court, I would affirm, remanding only to permit 
appellees to be reimbursed for any out-of-pocket expenses they 
incurred with respect to the Dyckman property. I cannot in good 
conscience join in a decision which will reward perfidy and breach 
of trust with more than $270,000, an amount which, even in Texas, 
must be substantial.146 
 
This demonstrates the way in which real life effects on the people before them can 
become matters of personal conscientious concern and commitment for individual 
judges who may, in rare instances, simply not be able to reconcile themselves to 
the practical outcomes dictated by the law.  A remedies case showing similar 
concerns addresses it in terms of “judicial conscience,” “human conscience,” and 
“considerable grief” (the last of which must surely mark it out as fitting clearly in 
                                                          
145
 Thomas v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1990) (Van Graafeiland, J., concurring) 
(emphasis added). 
146
 Harris v. Sentry Title Co., Inc., 715 F.2d 941, 961 (5th Cir. 1983) (Will, J., dissenting). 
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the personal conscience category).  This was a matter the judge truly took to heart.  
Judge Goldberg wrote in concurrence:  
 
It is with considerable grief that I write to specially concur in the 
result denying punitive damages against the City of Houston. I 
fully concur in the majority opinion on all other issues, but must 
specially concur on the issue of punitive damages because the 
majority suggests that City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc. might 
allow punitive damages against a municipality in a section 1983 
suit if the facts were particularly egregious. Would that it were so, 
for then I could, with clear judicial conscience, urge taxing the 
City of Houston with punitive damages. If there were any narrow 
gap around Newport for an egregious case, this one would slip 
through; I am aghast at the thought that any violation of 
constitutional rights more appalling, more threatening than the one 
that occurred here might actually exist. Sadly, I view Newport as 
presenting an impenetrable barrier to punitive damages. Would that 
it were not so, for now I must, with troubled human conscience, 
concur in this unfortunate result.147 
 
Here again, the human conscience may be troubled and grieved at a level that 
requires the judge to express that conscientious disagreement with the law, but the 
judicial conscience restrains the judge from dissenting without legal grounds to do 
so.148 
 
 C.  Dissenting to Express and Follow Personal Conscience 
 
 Another few cases will add to this picture the contrast between 
expressions of personal conscience placed in concurrences and those in dissents. 
For example, in a case about negligence liability under the Longshore and Harbor 
Worker’s Compensation Act (“LHWCA”), Judge Selya (who called it a “close 
and vexing case”) wrote in a concurring opinion: 
 
This reasoning leads me to conclude, with all respect, either that 
Congress inadvertently muddied the waters in phrasing LHWCA § 
905(b), or, alternatively, that Jones & Laughlin was wrongly 
                                                          
147
 Webster v. City of Houston, 689 F.2d 1220, 1230-31 (5th Cir. 1982) (Goldberg, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
148
 See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 3 (1985) (“Even in hard cases, though 
judges enforce their own convictions about matters of principle, they need not and 
characteristically do not enforce their own opinions about wise policy.”) 
DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
 
52 
 
decided. Still, I recognize that the Supreme Court's opinion is 
binding on this court, and that we therefore must undertake what 
Judge Campbell charitably terms “an elusive quest.” Ante at note 
11. Once reconciled to that necessity, I can in good conscience 
join this court's cogent opinion. I write separately, however, to 
urge the Supreme Court and Congress to reflect upon the mind 
games that Jones & Laughlin-particularly as applied to harbor 
workers-compels us to play, and, hopefully, to revisit the question 
of whether “dual capacity” employers should be liable at all in 
negligence actions brought by their employees.149 
 
Strong feeling like this is something that often prompts dissents, which brings us 
back once more to the examples noted at the outset of the paper, perhaps some of 
the clearest and most direct statements of purely personal conscientious objection 
to the application of pertinent law. In the three cases of Rico v. Terhune,150 
Wallace v. Castro,151 and Turner v. Candelaria,152 all of which came before the 
same three-judge panel on the Ninth Circuit, the three-strikes law was at issue.  In 
each case, the majority opinion was denoted a memorandum opinion.  In each 
case there was a very brief concurrence by Judge Reinhardt, who wrote only: “I 
concur only under compulsion of the Supreme Court decision in Andrade. I 
believe the sentence is both unconscionable and unconstitutional.”  This 
demonstrates quite simply and straightforwardly both Judge Reinhardt’s 
conscientious commitment to stay within the bounds of the role in deciding cases 
according to controlling law and also his personal conscientious view that the 
substance of the law is wrong.153  Furthermore, in each case there was an even 
briefer dissent by Judge Pregerson, who wrote only: “In good conscience, I can’t 
vote to go along with the sentence imposed in this case.”154  Without further legal 
reasoning, this comes across as a purely personal aversion to the content and the 
effect of the applicable law. 
                                                          
149
 Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit, J/V, 97 F.3d 603, 616 (1st Cir. 1996) (Selya, J., concurring).  
Judge Cyr, in his dissenting opinion in the same case, did not himself use the word ‘conscience’, 
but implicitly contrasted his own view, using instead the term of “fundamental disagreement” to 
express the basis for his dissent from the court’s following of the applicable Supreme Court 
precedent. Id. at 616 (Cyr, J., dissenting) (“As I am in fundamental disagreement with the 
treatment given the duties of care incumbent upon dual capacity LHWCA employers by the en 
banc court under the Supreme Court decision in Scindia, I respectfully dissent.”).  This shows an 
equally strong feeling, albeit without choosing to pick up on ‘conscience’ as a specific term. 
150
 Rico v. Terhune, 63 Fed. Appx. 394 (9th Cir. 2003). 
151
 Wallace v. Castro, 65 Fed. Appx. 618 (9th Cir. 2003). 
152
 Turner v. Candelaria, 64 Fed. Appx. 647 (9th Cir. 2003). 
153
 Rico, 63 Fed. Appx. at *1; Wallace, 65 Fed. Appx. at 619; Turner, 64 Fed. Appx. at 648. 
154
 Rico, 63 Fed. Appx. at *1; Wallace, 65 Fed. Appx. at 619; Turner, 64 Fed. Appx. at 648. 
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What makes these separate opinions in the three-strikes cases all the more 
intriguing is that they were written in cases that were all unanimously determined 
by the panel to be fit for decision without oral argument, and they were not 
selected for official publication.  This raises some significant questions about the 
point or the rhetorical force of the statements of conscience, and at the same time 
offers a scenario in which the statements of conscience might be shown to be (as a 
purely practical matter) harmless and therefore less problematic.  If nothing else, 
it underscores the reality that the judges involved accepted that the law was well-
settled, and that they knew they were not adding anything new to the conversation 
(such that publication would be required), and yet the pull of personal conscience 
was so strong that they did feel compelled to express that conscientious objection 
on the record. 
As these last few examples have demonstrated, personal conscientious 
objection to the substance of the law can sometimes forms the basis for the 
practice of repeated dissents.155  In fact, several examples have already come up 
in this discussion.156  The added weight of repeated dissents, and the overt 
reference to them by the judges writing them, especially where they are based on 
adherence to personal opposition to established law, is open to question.  On the 
one hand, they serve purposes that may be of value to the institution as whole, as 
signals to other courts, to litigants, to the other branches, and so on, about issues 
on which there is deeply felt concern from one with the benefit of the judicial 
perspective, which may gain added weight for the fact that they have persisted 
over time.  On the other hand, they may be harmful to the perception of the 
judiciary as less than fully open-minded on a given point, or as insufficiently 
committed to the application of the law as it is, rather than the law as that 
individual judge would prefer it to be.  It is beyond the scope of this paper to 
address these issues specific to repeated dissents, but whatever the answers to 
these questions, it is certain that judicial conscience must play into them. 
 
D.  Conclusions on Personal Conscience 
 
 Expressions of personal conscience may have some legitimate role to play, 
especially in concurring opinions, but one might still argue that no judicial 
opinion can ever be purely an expression of personal conscience, simply by virtue 
                                                          
155
 Allison Orr Larsen, Perpetual Dissents, 15 GEO. MASON  L. REV. 447 (2008). 
156For example, Judge Van Graafeiland, in Thomas v. Sullivan, 922 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1990) 
(Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting)noted his own prior dissent in Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 49 
(2d Cir. 1983) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).  Along similar lines, but repeating a concurrence 
rather than a dissent, Judge Coleman, as he noted in his concurrence in United States v. Scruggs, 
had previously expressed the same position in concurrences in both United States v. Bailey, 480 
F.2d 518, 519 (5th Cir. 1973) (Coleman, J., concurring) and Thaggard v. United States, 354 F.2d 
735, 739 (5th Cir. 1965 (Coleman, J., concurring).   
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of the fact that it occurs in a judicial opinion.  There is something about the mere 
fact of remaining in the role, rather than recusing or resigning, that might be taken 
as an indication that the individual judge sees the expression of personal 
conscientious commitment to be itself an appropriate fulfillment of at least certain 
aspects of the responsibilities of the judicial role.  This idea of overlap and 
interplay is brought to the fore in a rather muddy middle ground in which judicial 
opinions show intertwined references to both institutional and personal 
conscience.   
 
V.  The Middle Ground: Intertwined Personal and Institutional Conscience 
 
 A. Intertwined Usage 
 
 One might argue that no judge ever writes anything in an official opinion 
without some comment, express or implied, about the institutional responsibility 
of the judge, and no judge can write anything as an individual without there being 
some aspect of personal conscientious commitment to what he or she writes.  
Even so, as the last two sections of this article have explored, there are some 
expressions of conscience that are more dominated by institutional concerns, and 
other expressions that appeal more to personal than institutional conscience.  
However, there is also a middle category in which the personal and the 
institutional conscience are put forward with roughly equal force.  Very often, for 
reasons that will be explored as we go along, these examples come up in cases 
having to do with liberty issues, and matters of life and death – to be more 
precise, in death penalty cases.  A few excerpts will reveal the complexities of the 
overlap of conscientious concerns in several such cases.   
A death penalty case in the Ninth Circuit brought before a three judge 
panel a question (among others) of the constitutionality of hanging as a method of 
execution.  In the initial panel opinion, Judge Reinhardt, writing in part-
concurrence, part-dissent, expressed a closely intertwined combination of 
personal and institutional conscientious commitments, as follows: 
 
In the absence of a judicial stay, the State of Washington is likely 
to hang Campbell before the Supreme Court even has an 
opportunity to decide whether hanging is constitutional. Today's 
order, refusing to exercise the authority and responsibility that is 
vested in us by our rules, demonstrates the majority's willingness 
to allow this unconscionable course of events to unfold. . . .  I 
recognize that our refusal to act in accordance with law does not 
mean that Campbell will necessarily be executed before he can file 
his petition for writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court or before 
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that Court can fully consider his constitutional claim. Justice 
O'Connor, our Circuit Justice, can issue a stay if she is so inclined, 
or the full Court can do so if five Justices vote to grant a stay. 
However, that should not ease the conscience of any member of 
this court or serve as an excuse for anyone's failure to perform his 
or her duty properly. We could say in any case that comes before 
us: “What difference does it make whether we follow the law? The 
Supreme Court can undo whatever we do or fail to do.” No self-
respecting jurist would take that position in the ordinary case. It 
would be even less acceptable to do so here. A court that respects 
the rule of law must adhere to its obligation and do its duty.157 
 
When there was later a proposal for the court to rehear the case en banc, again 
Judge Reinhardt dissented, this time at great length, including arguments such as 
these:  
 
Hanging is, without the slightest doubt, “cruel and unusual”-in 
layman's terms and in the constitutional sense. No other answer is 
consistent with our claim to be an enlightened and civilized nation. 
In Anno Domini 1994, when almost every state and most other 
nations have rejected such a savage and barbaric method of killing 
its citizens, no court could in good conscience say that hanging 
comports with our “evolving standards of decency.” It is 
inconceivable to me that in one corner of our vast and proud 
country, a single judicial circuit is willing to violate its 
constitutional obligations and permit this unconscionable and long 
outmoded practice to exist.  In a time when public fear of crime 
and violence is high, it may be understandable that some judges 
will on occasion close their eyes to the dictates of the Constitution, 
and employ whatever form of rationalization or self-deception will 
lead them to the result they deem expedient. . . .   [T]he majority's 
decision to disregard all relevant Supreme Court precedent is 
simply inexplicable. Still, democracy has proved resilient and our 
Constitution has grown stronger as time has passed, 
notwithstanding temporary setbacks at the hands of courts 
motivated on occasion by political objectives. It has grown 
stronger in part because the judiciary on the whole has proved to 
be courageous, independent, and fair minded. The courts have 
usually corrected their own sins and errors long before they 
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became irremediable. In this case, as in others, the Constitution 
will ultimately emerge unscathed. It is only this court that will be 
diminished by what the majority does today. Until we reverse 
today's decision, our circuit will have a blotch on its reputation 
that will be a constant embarrassment to us all. I hope that before 
long we will be able to comprehend what has for some time been 
apparent to most of the rest of the civilized world. … Without 
question, and despite the decision of my colleagues, hanging 
violates the Constitution. I dissent.158  
 
There is a great deal going on in this excerpt – much of it self-explanatory – but 
there are several points to be drawn out in particular to add to the understanding 
of how judges themselves view the role of their conscientious commitments to 
both the institution and their personal integrity in their decisionmaking.  There is 
concern for the reputation of the institution,159 concern for fidelity to 
constitutional obligations, and concern for getting the law right over time, and 
concern for restraint from acting politically (i.e. beyond the proper scope of the 
role), all of which are most clearly matters of conscientious commitment to the 
institution.  There is also concern for courage, and for deference to an ordinary 
sense of what is right, and for the practical realities of human concerns (in the use 
of words like ‘savage’ and ‘barbaric’), all of which might fit more naturally into 
the category of personal conscience.160   
With equal feeling albeit at somewhat lesser length, in two part-
concurrence part-dissents (using identical language in each), Judge Pregerson of 
the Ninth Circuit spoke to institutional conscience with regard to due process 
problems, emphasizing the unfortunate practical result of the majority approach, 
but also added a reference to personal prayer, surely the most personal of 
references or resorts to conscience: 
 
This unconscionable result violates due process by forcing children 
either to suffer de facto expulsion from the country of their birth or 
forego their constitutionally-protected right to remain in this 
country with their family intact. . . . As I have said before, “I pray 
that soon the good men and women in our Congress will 
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 Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 716-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring and 
dissenting) (emphasis added). 
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 See discussion supra at Section III.F. 
160
 There is also a depth of potential implied meaning in the use of the phrase “Anno Domini” 
where one might have simply used the word “year.”  Whether this is intended to conjure up 
specifically the judge’s own conscientious commitment to Christian dogma must remain purely 
conjectural, but it is an intriguing reference. 
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ameliorate the plight of families like the [petitioner's] and give us 
humane laws that will not cause the disintegration of such 
families.”161 
 
The judge is perfectly transparent, first about basing his opinion firmly on due 
process grounds, and second about the depth of his personal concern about getting 
the law right in this particular area due to what he sees as its inhumane effects.  
He even uses the arguably heightened language of prayer to make his point about 
the importance of getting it right, which points beyond merely institutional to 
deeply-felt personal ideals of justice.    
In another case on the same immigration issue, Judge Pregerson omitted 
the reference to prayer, but retained the statement about the unconscionability of 
the result.162  Intriguingly, the majority opinion in that case responded to Judge 
Pregerson’s position as follows: 
 
Despite our conclusion, we agree with the sentiments expressed in 
the dissent. This is an unfortunate outcome in a sympathetic case. 
To remove a single mother of three who has lawfully lived and 
worked in the United States for two decades, despite the family 
upheaval and separation that it will entail, is “unconscionable,” see 
Dissent at 62; that this pro se petitioner has been unable to obtain 
review of the BIA's decision to deny relief because of procedural 
errors is also unfair. However, the result we reach is dictated by 
existing law and does not, as a matter of law, violate the Due 
Process Clause.163   
 
This suggests that the conscience that is offended here is purely personal, and that 
institutional conscience (if such a thing exists at all in the view of the majority – 
that is not clear here) is entirely a matter of following the dictates of existing law.  
To further complicate the picture about what messages may have been intended in 
all of these statements, all three of these immigration cases were decided without 
oral argument, and none of the three were selected for official publication, 
indicating both that the court does not see them as making a new or notable 
contribution to the corpus of the law, and restricting their citation back to the 
court as authority in later matters.  For all this expression of conscientious feeling 
about getting the law right, there is also an aspect of keeping these expressions 
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 Benitez v. Mukasey, 270 Fed. Appx. 523, 525-26 (9th Cir. 2008) (Pregerson, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Gonzales v. Keisler, 251 Fed. 
Appx. 435, 436 (9th Cir. 2007) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
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 Carranza v. Holder, 356 Fed. Appx. 61, 63 (9th Cir. 2009) (Pregerson, J., dissenting). 
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under certain wraps which may suggest even more strongly that the judges 
ultimately view these as personal, and even perhaps futile, matters of 
disagreement, not really intended for public use or consumption. 
Often these cases of intertwined conscientious commitments appear in 
cases whose facts, like those in the deportation and death penalty examples, pull 
especially strongly on human emotions. Judge Torruella, in a dissenting opinion 
drawing on both his personal conscientious reaction to the facts of the case and 
also his commitment to the conscientious responsibility of the institution, wrote as 
follows: 
 
The specter of an adult, particularly one in a position of trust such 
as a stepfather, sexually abusing his minor stepchildren is enough 
to incense even the most equanimous person and to wish upon 
such a miscreant the full retributive weight of the law. But there 
lies the catch: the law. We live in an ordered society, and to keep it 
ordered for the benefit of the whole of society, we are bound to 
apply the law, not just to do what we believe the abominable 
person charged may justly deserve. . . . Because I cannot in good 
conscience find that the trial court's ruling in this case reasonably 
applied established federal law when considering the petitioner's 
Sixth Amendment rights and because the court engaged in no 
perceptible balancing of the considerations required under White, I 
am forced to conclude that the petitioner in this case is entitled to 
the habeas relief he seeks.164 
 
Similarly, in a Sixth Circuit case approving the lower court’s requirement of a 
GPS tracking device for a sex offender, Judge Keith dissented, with what appears 
to be a combination of personal and institutional conscience.  He wrote:  
 
Because our Circuit has foreclosed Does’ argument with respect to 
the Registration Act, . . . I concur with the majority’s dismissal of 
this claim.  However, as to the Surveillance Act, I strongly 
disagree with the majority's decision to affirm the district court's 
dismissal of this claim. I cannot, in good conscience, join my 
colleagues' opinion which finds no constitutional violation in 
requiring Doe to wear a relatively large box as a symbol of his 
crime for all to see. The Surveillance Act, particularly the satellite-
based monitoring program, as applied to Doe, is punishment, 
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 Abram v. Gerry, 672 F.3d 45, 53-54 (1st Cir. 2012) (Torruella, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) 
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excessive, and indeed, the modern day “scarlet letter.” I 
vigorously dissent.165 
 
There is a combination here of strong personal feeling about what is being 
imposed, along with an ordinary judicial concern for legal error in the application 
of punitive measures in a scenario in which punitive measures are not 
permitted.166  This is all the more noteworthy given the fact that there were some 
grounds on which the judge did agree with the majority.  This shows a very strong 
commitment to the institutional conscientious obligation to get the law right, 
which works in combination with a personal conscientious view of the reality of 
the requirement in question here. 
 
 B.  Lack of Specific Authority or Limits 
 
It makes common sense that institutional and personal conscience can 
become intertwined in this way, and yet in all these examples, there is still little 
indication of any specific authority for resort to personal conscience, or any 
official idea of the limitations on the role it may play in judicial reasoning.  Judge 
Gould addressed one view on this question in commenting on the purpose of 
writing dissenting opinions, in a case about the Foreign Sovereign Immunities 
Act.167  Spurred on by his misgiving about the interpretation and application of 
the law in light of a quite sympathetic plaintiff, writing in dissent, he explained: 
 
One might ask, when there is such a firm supermajority for a 
position, what is the value of a dissent? The answer is that I pen 
this dissent to explain my views, because a dissent is a matter of 
individual judicial statement and individual judicial conscience. 
The majority's opinion is reasonable, even persuasive, but only 
within the limits it sets by invoking the plain-meaning rule. If the 
language was as plain to me as the majority perceives it to be, I 
would adopt a similar view and shrug off a concern that Congress 
has blundered. However, I view the language as ambiguous and I 
view traditional modes of statutory interpretation as pointing in a 
different direction, for the reasons that follow. These views may be 
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 Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1008-09 (6th Cir. 2007) (Keith, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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 Id. 
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 Cassirer v. Kingdom of Spain, 616 F.3d 1019, 1038n.1 (9th Cir. 2010) (Gould, J., dissenting) 
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considered by the bench of another court, by the interested bar, or 
by other interested persons.168 
 
There are no easy answers to questions about the exact definition of 
judicial conscience, or the propriety of its use or placement in opinions of federal 
appellate judges, but at this point we have seen the broad span of positions taken 
in practice.  We turn next to a more overarching assessment of what the actual 
practice of judges shows about the value and the legitimacy of references to 
judicial conscience, either institutional or personal, and how that fits into the 
ethics of the judicial role.  
 
VI.  Legitimacy of Various Uses and Placements 
 
 A. Conscience in the Context of Core Commitments of Judicial Role 
 
This examination of expressions of judicial conscience in federal appellate 
opinions as they occur in actual judicial practice shows that most such expressions 
refer to some idea of the conscience of the court as an institution.  The special 
perspective of the bench allows judges to bring into the decisionmaking process 
certain considerations that draw on the broader practical and ethical 
responsibilities of the role.   The core commitments of the judicial role as a 
trusteeship of the law – fidelity to legal (especially constitutional) authority, 
impartiality, independence, accountability, and practical wisdom – are expressed 
in these instances as matters of ‘conscience,’ in the judges’ own terms.  The use 
of the word ‘conscience’ seems to be intended in these instances to underscore the 
seriousness or weight of the consideration, the feeling of professional 
responsibility that compels the judge to make a particular decision.  There is 
added value here in the potential for better understanding of both the judicial role 
and the law itself, so these expressions should be encouraged.  They may be 
perfectly appropriate in any type of opinion, whether majority, concurrence, or 
dissent.  The best placement will be dependent on the context of each case. 
While expressions of institutional conscience are appropriate and valuable 
in any type of opinion, there is different rhetorical force and effect to be achieved 
in different placements. Reference to the influence of institutional conscience in a 
majority opinion has the advantages of showing a consensus view of the judicial 
role and showing concern for fulfillment of the obligations of the role.  That is, 
properly expressed it should enhance both understanding of and confidence in the 
professional integrity of the judiciary. 
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In a concurring opinion, there is still a certain amount of consensus with 
the majority, and the expression of conscience is still a demonstration of concern 
for and commitment to the institution itself.  The main difference is that writing 
separately may be an effective way to draw more attention to the conscientious 
aspect of the decision the court is making.  What might have been buried or might 
have seemed less remarkable in the context of other reasoning in a majority 
opinion can be especially highlighted in a separate opinion, which will likely get a 
reader’s attention at least to see what it concerns.   
A dissent can be effective, like a concurrence, simply in getting attention 
on the issue, by virtue of being separate and indicating some disagreement with 
the majority.  A reader will not likely skip it.  However, a dissent shows a deeper 
level of disagreement than a concurrence, and thus while they may be perfectly 
correct, they may come at some cost to a unified appearance of the judiciary, 
which may bring with it further costs for public confidence.169  That said, 
disagreement that is openly discussed in opinions should be a good thing, insofar 
as it indicates robust argument.  It enhances (or at least should do so) the quality 
of the reasoning relied on in the decisionmaking process.  The transparency about 
the disagreement, especially to the extent that it reveals something about the 
meaning and the role of the institutional conscience of the judiciary, is 
valuable.170  If there is some mention of judicial conscience in a separate opinion, 
especially if it is in a dissent, it is exceedingly helpful if the writers of majority 
opinions respond to that in some way to indicate their own view of the 
conscientious fulfillment of institutional obligations in the analysis of the case, or 
to say how personal conscience should or should not play in.  Such dialogue is 
most helpful in getting to the bottom of judicial perspectives on the meaning and 
the role of judicial conscience. 
 
B. Problems with Expressions of Personal Conscience 
 
 When it comes to expressions of personal conscience, things are 
somewhat more complex.  Where expressions of personal conscience are 
intertwined with institutional conscience, it may be a perfectly good thing, insofar 
as it shows a significant level of personal devotion to the role.   However, it 
remains fairly unclear where the line is drawn between the personal and the 
institutional in some cases, and it is certainly unclear what if any limits there are 
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 See, e.g., William A. Bowen, Dissenting Opinions, 17 GREEN BAG 690, 696 (1905) (“Of the 
many injurious aspects of the Dissenting Opinion, one of the most destructive is that by 
emphasizing the personal composition of courts it is subversive of their great anonymous 
authority.  The more impersonal their character, the more willing is the respect they earning.”) 
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 See, e.g., Stanley H. Fuld, The Voices of Dissent, 62 COLUM. L. REV. 923, 926-27 (1962) 
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on how personal conscience may play in.  Some judges do mention it, and there is 
no clear indication from the opinions about any legal prohibition on it, so we have 
to take these expressions to be a part of picture of the judicial role, albeit an 
unsettled.  Where a judge allows the personal commitments to come in, but 
recognizes that the personal is trumped by the obligation to follow the law, there 
may be a happy balance of sorts.  This may not be a balance that falls assuredly 
within the proper bounds of the role, but the balance is arguably a no-harm, no-
foul resolution that may be helpful to public confidence in and understanding of 
the role, to allow these sorts of escape valve for serious clashes between personal 
and professional integrity.171   
However, expression of personal conscience to trump the conscientious 
obligations to the institution in a dissenting opinion is definitely problematic.  
There the personal is permitted to trump the professional obligation not just as a 
matter of expression, but as a matter of action.  The judge in these situations 
declines to follow the law.  It is not a no-harm, no-foul scenario just because the 
others on the panel followed the law.  Even the rhetoric of dissent is enough to 
convey the idea that it is proper for judges to subvert the law, to prefer their own 
idea of ‘right’ or ‘justice’ rather than the law as it stands.  This undermines the 
judicial ideal of impartiality.172  More practically, it suggests that if another judge 
on the panel had happened to take the same view of adherence to his or her own 
personal conscientious commitments, the result would have been different, and 
blatantly extra-legal.  This would be an abdication of the role, despite other 
available approaches that might help a judge resolve the dissonance without harm 
to the corpus of the law.173  The escape valve idea that may be appropriate in a 
concurrence will not withstand scrutiny here, even for rhetorical effect in the most 
dramatic case.  It says “I will not follow the law” which is only proper for 
someone who is not charged specifically with applying the law.  It says “I will (or 
at any rate, I would if I could) use my power as a judge to impose the law as I 
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 Though he does not provide any authority for the proposition, one author specifically suggests 
the use of concurring and dissenting opinions as appropriate platforms for expression of a judge’s 
convictions.  R. Dean Moorhead, The 1952 Ross Prize Essay: Concurring and Dissenting 
Opinions, 38 A.B.A. J. 821, 822 (1952) (“[A]s a matter of morals and good conscience, such 
opinions enable their authors to express their convictions in lieu of silently assenting to a majority 
opinion in which they do not believe.”). 
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 Another word that might be used in place of ‘impartiality’ in this sense might be ‘objectivity.’  
The dimensions of the meaning of that word, though, are well beyond the scope of this article.  For 
an extensive account of the relationship between objectivity and legal decisionmaking, see 
Matthew H. Kramer, OBJECTIVITY AND THE RULE OF LAW (2007).  See also Fiss, supra note 58, at 
149-171 (on objectivity and interpretation). 
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 Here Prof. Brand-Ballard, for instance, would disagree, though using the specific language of 
morality, rather than ‘conscience’ specifically.  See Brand-Ballard, supra note 16, passim.   
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wish it were.”  Such partiality for the judge’s own view of what is right will only 
undermine confidence in the impartiality of judicial decisionmaking.174 
Judges must be mindful about the extent to which their expression of 
personal commitments may suggest to the public that the outcome of a given case 
may be different according to the personal commitments of the judge assigned.  
Such individualism does not exemplify the kind of independence that ought to be 
upheld as the judicial ideal.  There may be power (in practice) to rely on personal 
conscientious commitments over against legal or other institutional commitments, 
but there is no proper authority to do so.175 
Dissenting on grounds of personal conscience without officially 
publishing the opinion does not solve or avoid the problem.  The reality of 
unpublished opinions is that they are still readily available, and even if they 
cannot be officially cited back to the court with the weight of authority, they 
indicate arguments that could be made to the court and might well be persuasive, 
even if the case itself is not cited.  Nor is the solution to dissent on the basis of 
commitment to personal conscience without writing that in an opinion at all.  
Judges, as trustees, are obliged to account for their management of the corpus of 
the law by explaining the reasoning that stands behind a decision to dissent.   
So often, the truest clashes of personal and professional conscience come 
about as a result of a judge’s deep-seated desire to see justice done.  Where it 
seems to a judge that the law produces unjust results, judicial conscience (both 
institutional and personal) may prompt the judge to draw attention to problems 
that may not have been seen or anticipated by lawmakers in the first instance.  
This can be a quite proper fulfillment of the judge’s professional trusteeship 
obligations.  Whether it is legitimate as such will depend on the circumstances 
and explanation of that matter of conscience and the role the judge is playing in 
expressing it.  The more the judge raises the issue to make sure it is clearly 
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 Writing about Supreme Court justices making decisions on matters of Constitutional Law, Prof. 
Powell emphasized that the legitimacy of these decisions depend on the perception that the justices 
are playing by the rules.  Powell, supra note 1, at 43.  That said, he also asserts that in such cases 
there is always a correct (i.e. yes or no) answer, no matter how close the case.  Id.  This second 
point may be less true in the broad sweep of decisions covered by the judges who are the focus of 
this article.  In any event, the idea that judges can unilaterally exempt themselves from the rules of 
the game (i.e. following established law) when it offends their individual consciences is at the very 
least problematic for public confidence.  For further discussion of the jurisprudence of following 
the rules, see, e.g., Frederick Schauer,  PLAYING BY THE RULES, A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION 
OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Dworkin, supra note 148, passim. 
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 It is worth remembering at this point, however, that there are other practical options for a judge 
who feels truly stuck, as a matter of personal and professional integrity, between an obligation to a 
faithfully apply law and fidelity to his personal conscience.  A judge may recuse, may mention the 
difficulty in a concurring opinion (thus showing deference, within the role, to the legal authority), 
or if the situation is more extreme and the judge feels so compelled, the judge may even resign his 
position in order to give free rein to his own conscience and preserve his own sense of integrity. 
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understood and thus can be properly considered by those with legislative or 
interpretive authority, without the judge acting beyond the scope of the role by 
diverging from the application of the law, the more likely it is to be safely within 
the proper bounds of the judicial role.  By contrast, the more the judge not only 
raises the issue but feels compelled to act on the conscientious disagreement by 
refusing to apply the law as it stands, the further the expression lies outside the 
bounds of judicial propriety, elevating adherence to personal conscience above 
institutional conscience.   
While one would never define the judicial role as one in which personal 
commitments of the role occupants are intended explicitly to take precedence over 
professional commitments, there may be a certain tolerance in actual practice for 
an occasional release of personal steam by judges, in recognition that the role is a 
demanding and difficult one, and an escape valve is sometimes necessary where it 
does not impede or interfere with the ultimate application of the law.  There are 
advantages to a certain flexibility along these lines.  First, these occasional, and 
often very human, responses to what the judge perceives as an injustice worked 
by the law as interpreted and applied by the majority, may allow the public to see 
that that judges consider cases very carefully, and that while their role is not 
ordinarily one that resorts to personal considerations, they are human beings, and 
cannot always turn a blind eye to their personal commitments, which may well be 
personal commitments of members of the public, and which in any event have not 
(by virtue of being placed in a concurrence) interfered with the application of the 
law.  Second, these expressions may indicate to potential future occupants of the 
judicial role that there may be in rare instances a way out of a spot that creates 
difficulties for personal integrity, which may encourage some to pursue a judicial 
career who would otherwise have been deterred by the prospect of being 
absolutely stuck in a situation in which they might feel compelled to speak up as 
to personal commitments.  Third, they signal to the legislature what may be 
unintended consequences of a particular law, and open the possibility of further 
legislative consideration of making a change to the law.176   
For any of these good effects to arise, transparency about what is going on 
is of course essential.  The judge must be straightforward about the role played by 
the personal commitments in the consideration of the case.  And for these good 
effects to provide the underpinnings of the legitimacy of the practice, the practice 
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 Alerting a higher court of legislative body to the need to amend or change the law, whether that 
is aimed at a simple correction of language or a wholesale changing of the legislative mind to “get 
the law right,” is more legitimate the more it arises from an institutional perspective and concern, 
and less legitimate the more it arises from a purely personal commitment.  But acting without 
authority to make the correction, despite accompanying expressions of a desire to “do justice,” 
only undermines the authority and legitimacy of the judicial role.  Whatever rhetorical emphasis is 
gained by doing this sort of thing in a dissenting opinion is just as surely lost in terms of respect 
for credibility and restraint expected of the judiciary.   
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must be truly rare for any given judge.  The incorporation of, and indeed the 
reliance on, personal commitments, as opposed to straightforward application of 
the law alone, may well remain unexpressed in many cases.  However, in those 
cases, the other reasons actually expressed in a given opinion, will be able to be 
judged as legitimate or not on their own terms, so that the personal commitment 
will not in those instances have overridden a legitimate basis for a decision.   
The line between institutional conscience and personal conscience is not 
always easy to draw, and there is even less clarity about the authority of judges 
openly to incorporate personal conscience into the decisionmaking process.  
However, as long as judges do resort to personal conscience (and the expressions 
we can identify indicate that it does happen, and the lack of explicit authority to 
do so suggests that it may happen more often that it is openly expressed), the 
transparency offered by open expression of personal conscience is better than 
hiding it.  One might argue that the public will have more confidence in the 
judiciary if judicial personalities do not show.  But hiding certain aspects of 
judicial decisionmaking, whether because they are not allowed or because it is 
unclear whether they are allowed, holds us back from a full understanding of what 
goes on in the judicial role, and thus prevents us from engaging in the best 
regulation of that role.   
Wherever conscience is expressed as a matter of fulfillment of the 
responsibilities of the role, value is added to our understanding.  Evading 
questions about the responsibilities of the role with regard to personal 
conscientious commitments, by contrast, comes at a cost.  Judges, as trustees of 
the law, are accountable for the reasoning underlying their decisions.  Omitting 
expression of personal conscience, without first clarifying explicitly what counts 
as personal (as opposed to institutional) conscience, what the limits are on its 
legitimate use in the decisionmaking process, and what the authority is for all of 
that, does not resolve the issues.  Instead it keeps observers of the judiciary from 
understanding what role personal conscience might properly play.  If, with 
transparency and with time, it becomes clear that personal conscience has no role 
to play, that will work itself out.  As Judge Cardozo wisely said: 
 
The flaws are there as in every human institution. Because they are 
not only there but visible, we have faith that they will be corrected. 
There is no assurance that the rule of the majority will be the 
expression of perfect reason when embodied in constitution or in 
statute. We ought not to expect more of it when embodied in the  
judgments of the courts. The tide rises and falls, but the sands of 
error crumble. … Ever in the making, as law develops through the 
centuries, is this new faith which silently and steadily effaces our 
mistakes and eccentricities. I sometimes think that we worry 
DRAFT: DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION 
 
 
66 
 
ourselves overmuch about the enduring consequences of our 
errors. They may work a little confusion for a time. In the end, they 
will be modified or corrected or their teachings ignored. The future 
takes care of such things. In the endless process of testing and 
retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross, and a constant 
retention of whatever is pure and sound and fine.177 
 
We can only aspire to this perfection of the law over time, though, if we persist in 
asking the hard questions and carefully examining what really goes on in judicial 
practice and why.   
 
VII.   Conclusion 
 
 Despite a lack of perfect clarity or consistency among federal appellate 
judicial views on the meaning of or the propriety of reference to or reliance on 
judicial conscience, these expressions do come into play.  Most of the expressions 
of conscience examined in this article, even when expressed in terms of a first-
person perspective, and even though they may be a matter of personal 
commitment (to the role), are nonetheless expressions of institutional 
responsibility, and are therefore perfectly appropriate in any opinion – majority, 
concurrence, or dissent.  These can be useful expressions in that they demonstrate 
to the public the careful consideration of judges not only of the cases and 
questions before them, but of the special role they play, and the seriousness with 
which they play the role.  This can legitimately boost a proper and meaningful 
public confidence in the judiciary.  Where expressions of personal conscience are 
concerned, as discussed in the previous section, many significant questions about 
the legitimacy of the use and expression of individual conscientious commitment 
remain unanswered.  These are questions that must be more deeply and openly 
explored by those who occupy the judicial role, on order that we may reach a 
better understanding of that role in all its fullness. 
This article has looked only at federal appellate judges, who have arguably 
less at stake than judges in their opinions when it comes to public approval or job 
security, and who have arguably more room for the expression of conscience in 
the context of judging in panels, when compared with those who judge alone.  
There are significant questions that would be all the more complex when it comes 
to judges who must seek re-election or re-appointment, who must make more 
factual determinations, and so on.178  This article has merely laid some of the 
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 For example, should the public or the executive branch choose judges on the basis of their 
personal commitments, or should or could those personal commitments remain irrelevant in the 
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groundwork by establishing rough categories for analysis and acknowledging the 
lack of definition and authority on any aspect of the questions at stake when it 
comes to judicial conscience.  In short, it opens a conversation about judicial 
conscience.  Many more issues must be explored, both in the federal appellate 
context and in other judicial contexts.179  Judges and scholars alike must continue 
to contribute to the effort to reach a better understanding of these issues, and thus 
a fuller understanding of the judicial role.   
                                                                                                                                                               
are essential questions to resolve for the better understanding and better practice of the selection 
and retention processes currently employed. 
179
 For example, if expressions of personal conscience are not legitimate, but are tolerated  in the 
appellate context for the occasional release of steam without actual disruption of the application of 
law, in separate opinions , will this act as the thin end of the wedge, encouraging a view that 
personal view are legitimate, and changing practice over time?  By contrast, if expressions of 
personal conscience are legitimate, what efforts ought lawyers to devote to making explicit 
appeals to judicial conscience in order to subvert the substantive law?   
